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Ideas drive the sociopolitical world. Components of an ideology can be combined, 
separated, manipulated, attacked, and blocked by social organizations for different 
purposes. A significant proportion of United States (U.S.) policy analysts and strategists 
lack an abstract conceptual model of ideological social movement strategy, which may 
assist an effective counterstrategy or preserve worldviews. That is, many policy analysts 
and decision makers are unclear about the necessary and sufficient conditions for social 
movements to put their ideologies into effect. Some may think that ideologies are abstract 
and therefore irrelevant to strategy. Others may discount the power of a highly resonant 
ideology carried by a social movement. Additionally, many people misunderstand 
ideology, simplifying it to a broad political thought-belief system—involving rational 
debate, which political thinkers value as the right way of approaching political 
questions.1 This study will allow the United States to gain a better understanding of 
collective action and its observable outputs. Military, political, and diplomatic decision 
makers who understand ideologies and how they are used by social movements can then 
be prepared to create effective policy solutions.  
This thesis examines how ideas interact and how they are used by social 
movements to form “conditional generalizations” about recruitment outputs.2 Its purpose 
is to isolate the ideological considerations of a social movement from other group needs 
and wants. It will determine what ideology does for the social movement and what it does 
to the social movement. In this thesis, I will highlight numerous movement behaviors to 
illustrate a range of ideology activities for unarmed resistance, insurgencies, revolutions, 
and so-called terrorist groups.  
                                                 
1 Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 1. 
2 Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 120, 133. For generic knowledge, George argues conditional 
generalizations are more useful than probabilistic generalizations.  
2 
This work seeks to fill a gap in knowledge between the political realm and the 
social sciences—how ideology can be partially and tentatively controlled. It began with 
an interest in the study of competing ideologies in the context of social movements. 
Policy analysts, strategists, and decision makers can benefit from a better understanding 
of how political leaders leverage ideology to enhance an effective social movement. The 
central question this thesis aims to answer is this: how can developing social movements 
operationalize ideologies? 
B. THE SITUATION AND PROBLEM 
Investigation into the nature of ideology helps us understand the roots of radical 
and oppositional political motivations. Politics is about collective organization and social 
relations for a purpose.  
1. Current Tensions with American Security 
Each social movement needs to make choices about its degrees of formality and 
size in order to achieve “the good society”—the social movement’s ideological goal. 
Movement leadership determines how flexible or rigid the organization should be at 
different stages of development. Ideological commitment (or the degree of commitment 
to the cause) by movement members is assumed to be a significant factor during 
developmental recruitment, but a movement’s leaders tend to balance this with 
operational flexibility. This is because competing movements will attempt to limit their 
operational constraints at every phase, and this includes those constraints brought on by 
ideological commitment.  
As such, in order for a given movement’s ideas to live, an insurgency might 
deprioritize ideology-based recruitment for organizational security, as was seen, for 
example, with the South African Communist Party’s armed support to the African 
National Congress. At other times, ideology may inflame movement growth, as it did 
with Nazism or countless other social movements. Ideology can be used by a 
government, insurgency, or terrorist group to recruit and mobilize supporters of the 
cause.  
3 
One’s religious stance is part of one’s ideology. As I will discuss in the next 
chapter, an ideology can be transmitted to individual people, so I will switch references 
periodically between groups and individuals. Ideology, like religion, often permeates an 
actor’s being and sense of self from birth. For most actors, it is something they are taught 
and convinced about. Ideological promises, however, can often be invalidated in the 
tangible world.3 Consider the Nazi-proclaimed thousand-year Reich, which in fact lasted 
just over a decade. The same is true of religious promises, like the doomsday flood 
prediction by the Millerites or the mass suicide of over 900 People’s Temple followers in 
Jonestown. Such strategic contradictions might be effective at disrupting external support 
for a movement, but those in the movement at the grassroots level will likely dismiss the 
rhetoric of the external naysayers. For many, the belief in the ideology driving a social 
movement runs too deep. 
Ideology encompasses a movement’s political thoughts and survival strategy, and 
it remains an effective resource for drawing popular support away from existing 
government systems and increasing support for developing movements. Whether for 
reform or revolution, social movements hold grievances against the system and seek to 
rectify them. The situation in the United States and around the world at present features 
competing ideological movements with varying degrees of flexibility. Understanding 
ideology profiles like liberalism, conservatism, socialism, fascism, and religious 
fundamentalism can inform policy analysts and decision makers on how to diagnose 
security problems in information warfare. Proper diagnosis can then lead to more 
effective strategies in this realm.  
2. A Lack of Understanding 
A significant problem in the ongoing information war is not knowing how 
ideologies are structured and how they move from one group to the next. This problem is 
acknowledged by many who deal with security affairs. For example, a recent Washington 
Post article headlined that former U.S. secretary of defense Leon Panetta and former 
                                                 
3 Anna Simons, “Recommendations” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 09 
December 2015).  
4 
British prime minister Tony Blair were taking the lead on a new Commission on 
Countering Violent Extremism sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies. In that piece, Panetta claimed that “government leaders do not yet fully 
understand the problem. ‘We haven’t been very effective at developing a strategy to 
reduce the allure of extreme ideologies both at home and abroad, to understand what we 
can do to undermine this narrative that attracts so many recruits to violence.’”4  
Recently, the Center released its first report on countering violent extremism. My 
thesis supports and further develops the strategy recommendations outlined in the report. 
Specifically, the report asks for research to focus on extremist “motivations and drivers, 
the radicalization process, and effective interventions.”5 This thesis addresses all three of 
these topics. However, the report outlines a complex and expensive plan for the 
international community, while this thesis adds a ready-to-execute and inexpensive 
Special Operations Forces recommendation in Chapter VI.  
The Commission’s report offers testimonials of extremist violence and 
recruitment, while this thesis discusses the mostly invisible competition of ideological 
narratives. In this way, it serves as a complement to the Commission’s report: First, the 
thesis offers a clear definition of ideology, as well as a depiction and explanation of 
social movement outputs. It questions claims such as the possibility of defeating violent 
extremist ideologies in 10 years or so.6 Further, it provides some needed introspection on 
American ideologies. Finally, it seeks to recognize that the justification of violence is 
often dependent on perspective. The Commission’s report highlights certain actors like 
religious leaders and pop culture stars to assist with countering narratives.7 However, 
Military Information Support Operations (MISO) are not explicitly mentioned in the 
                                                 
4 Elise Viebeck, “Tony Blair, Leon Panetta to launch antiterrorism commission,” The Washington 
Post, February 21, 2016, accessed March 8, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com /news/powerpost/wp/
2016/02/21/tony-blair-leon-panetta-to-launch-anti-terrorism-commission/. 
5 Shannon N. Green and Keith Proctor, Turning Point: A New Comprehensive Strategy for Countering 
Violent Extremism (A Report of the CSIS Commission on Countering Violent Extremism) (Washington, 
DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 14 November 2016), 62, https://www.csis.org/features/
turning-point/?block1. 
6 Ibid., V-VI. 
7 Ibid., 18. 
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Commission’s strategy. Similar to this thesis, the Commission’s strategy aggressively 
seeks a turning point for the international community of partners to disrupt the 
“underlying ideologies” that lead to violent extremism.8 
This thesis adds important information about ideology competition and offers 
actions to undermine ideological recruitment to extreme social movements. However, this 
study looks at ideology in broader terms than simply religious fundamentalism. Without 
more extensive information, participants risk entering information warfare insufficiently 
armed. Knowing how social movements operationalize ideology allows policy makers to 
form an authorizing policy for operational organizations like Special Operations Forces 
to anticipate actions and better compete internationally. 
C. A VERY SHORT REVIEW 
In this section, I provide a brief overview of ideology, its development, current 
understandings of it, and what it means for social movements to operationalize ideology. 
I also introduce readers to the political process model of social movement emergence and 
persistence. This section concludes with a brief discussion on consciousness to highlight 
the dynamics involved with ideological message interpreters. 
1. History and Development of Ideology 
An overview of the evolution of ideology will help clarify the term’s current 
usage. It was first coined in 1796 in a prison cell during the French Revolution by 
Antoine Destutt de Tracy, based on a concept in Sir Francis Bacon’s Novum Organum, 
published 176 years earlier.9 Bacon argued that what people believed was based on 
untruths, which led de Tracy to conceive of the scientific study of ideas. Iain MacKenzie 
explains the Napoleonic and Marxist views: Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821) went 
further, claiming that ideology was purely false ideas.10 Then, Karl Marx (1818–1883) 
                                                 
8 Green and Proctor, Turning Point, 8. 
9 Andrew Heywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction, 5th ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012), 5. 
10 Iain MacKenzie, “The Idea of Ideology,” in Political Ideologies: An Introduction, 3rd ed., additional 
authors Robert Eccleshall et al., (New York: Routledge, 2003), 3–5. 
6 
and Friedrich Engels criticized German philosophers and the conceptions of the German 
middle class, believing that reason, as well as revolution, could overcome ideology. Like 
Napoleon, Marx and Engels argued that false ideas could destroy political culture, 
explains MacKenzie. They saw ideology as a class struggle, not as a science for studying 
the development of true and false ideas. To them, ideology emerged from a 
socioeconomic base. They advocated revolutionary activities with the goal of dissolving 
class conflict. MacKenzie continues, they believed that in order to destroy false ideas, or 
ideologies, the contradictions in the class system must also be destroyed.  
Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924) built on Marx and Engels but deemphasized false 
ideas and class divisions.11 He conceptualized ideology as the foundation of all 
sociopolitical behavior, which is much closer to the current understanding of the term. 
MacKenzie recounts, Lenin saw ideology as a political weapon in class conflict and 
concluded that all forms of action are to a degree ideological. In fact, he saw socialism as 
an ideology in itself. 
Neo-Marxists added elements and complexity to the concept of ideology. Marxist 
philosopher Louis Althusser (1919–1990), and to a lesser degree Antonio Gramsci, 
conceptualized ideology as a binding agent for societies—a means of identifying one 
another and interacting together.12 If this definition of ideology is true, ideology can be 
organic and can encompass one’s total worldview. According to Althusser, liberal 
capitalist society includes “ideological state apparatuses” such as schools, churches, trade 
unions, and the family unit, which socialize people to status, competition, and rules of 
good citizenry.13 To Althusser, ideology was a permanent part of the material world.14 
Like Marx, he insisted on separating ideology and science, with the goal of removing 
false ideas from social and political life. When asked whether Marxism was an ideology, 
Althusser instead claimed that it was a science of political economy.  
                                                 
11 MacKenzie, “The Idea of Ideology,” 6.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 6–7. 
14 Michael Freeden, Ideology: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
27. 
7 
Another viewpoint of the nature of ideology is the Anglo-American idealist 
tradition. Ideology, under this concept, does not provide people with solutions to all 
moral dilemmas. The development beyond the idealist view believes ideology to be more 
complex, because ideas have a cultural life.15 Ideology exists in regular people engaging 
in political and social life, and pure logic is not usually the method to solve dynamic 
social problems.  
2. Defining Ideology 
The founding editor of the Journal of Political Ideologies, Michael Freeden, one 
of the most significant writers and editors on ideology today, defines ideology as political 
thinking about one’s world with action consistent with that understanding.16 The study of 
ideology investigates “organized, articulated, and consciously held systems of political 
ideas incorporating beliefs, attitudes, and opinions.”17 Freeden argues that ideologies are 
structured and “characterized by a morphology that displays core, adjacent, and 
peripheral concepts.”18 Morphological analysis, which ties in to history and culture, 
cannot reduce an ideology to a single viewpoint (e.g., political economy), as Marxists do. 
Andrew Heywood claims all ideological characteristics fit into three distinct 
features. They:  
(a) offer an account of the existing order, usually in the form of a “world 
view”  
(b) advance a model of a desired future, a vision of the “good society”  
(c) explain how political change can and should be brought about—how to 
get from (a) to (b).19  
The framework of “problem, solution, strategy” informs this study, and later I 
demonstrate how it relates to Freeden’s definition of ideology.  
                                                 
15 MacKenzie, “The Idea of Ideology,” 9. 
16 Ibid., 9, 10–11. 
17 Ibid., 8. 
18 Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, 77. 
19 Heywood, Political Ideologies, 11. This definition is consistent with Freeden’s contemporary works 
and de Tracy’s original conception of the term. 
8 
3. Operationalizing Ideology 
In this thesis, operationalizing ideology refers to the process of controlling ideas 
and activating them for one’s purpose. This is the process by which social movement 
leaders generate significant action from political ideas. Put another way, it is how a group 
appropriates an ideology for a significant political purpose. This definition entails 
sending ideas at a certain time along a communication pathway and attempting to 
influence the ideas of another sender. When a concept like an ideology is operationalized, 
the concept is not an abstract, logical thought-belief. Rather, ideas carry their own 
operative force that goes beyond logic and can be causal at unexpected times. For 
example, leaders of social movements such as the civil rights movement might 
operationalize ideology by employing mechanisms like slogans to modify the beliefs of 
their followers. 
4. The Political Process Model 
Social movements can illustrate the action of ideological groups that often operate 
outside legitimate institutions. They are just one type of social organization that employ 
ideologies, but the analysis of how they do so can be instructive. As the title of this thesis 
suggests, I will look at social movement organizations as they exist in a developmental 
process rather than in the emergence phase of social movements.  
Doug McAdam, in his analysis of the civil rights movement, developed models of 
movement emergence and development.20 He claims that elites monopolize power in 
political matters, such that excluded groups will always functionally hold less power. 
Thus, it is inevitable that the masses will compete for power.21 His model of movement 
emergence begins with the broad socioeconomic processes that can fracture existing 
political power.22 These, in turn, directly affect two additional factors: political 
                                                 
20 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970 (Chicago, 
IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1982). 
21 Ibid., 37. McAdam proposes an alternative model to classic theories of collective behavior, status 
inconsistency, and resource mobilization for movement emergence. The political process model looks at 
movements as political rather than psychological. 
22 Doowan Lee, “A Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Warfare,” Special Warfare (July -
September 2013): 29–30.  
9 
opportunities (e.g., political instability by destroying the status quo) and indigenous 
organizational strength (e.g., minority community resources). If political opportunities 
expand and indigenous resources of a minority population increase, the chances that a 
social movement will emerge increase. Expanding political opportunities and increased 
indigenous organizational strength can then interact and generate what McAdam calls 
cognitive liberation, which is the collective belief of a group that together they can bring 
about change.23  
When discussing movements in this thesis, I assume that the movement has 
already emerged and focus on how it persists. Whether a social movement persists 
depends on four factors: 1) shifting political opportunities, 2) shifting levels of social 
control, 3) sustaining organizational strength with resources, and 4) collective attribution 
(a continuation of the cognitions shared before emergence).24 The collective ideas that 
hold a group together are as vital as the resources it takes to sustain a given movement. 
As I will discuss later, operationalizing ideology is one way to recruit new members and 
thereby make the movement more likely to last. Many other important factors to 
movement development that will not be discussed in this paper include issues related to 
limited resources, impermanence, and co-opting. However, by operationalizing ideology 
effectively, movements can hedge against such dangers. 
5. Consciousness 
The receivers of ideological messaging use their minds to interpret whether ideas 
fit within their views of the sociopolitical world. Susan Blackmore claims that 
“information enters the nervous system through the senses… and ultimately affects a 
person’s speech and other actions.”25 Individuals often understand the world as either 
problematic or not problematic, and within that framework, they work to understand 
other people’s behaviors.26 Human behavior plays a significant role in consciousness—
                                                 
23 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 51. 
24 Ibid., 52–56.  
25 Susan Blackmore, Consciousness: An Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 37. 
When I bring up consciousness later in this thesis, I shift to Blackmore’s second edition.  
26 Ibid., 72. 
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and in ideology, as I will describe later. While definitive statements about consciousness 
can be contested, the topic is still worthy of analysis, since the social sciences constantly 
refer to it and interpretation of ideology involves it. 
D. A BRIEF EXPLANATION OF POLITICS 
This project does not equate politics to political parties; the term has a broader 
meaning in this context. The purpose of politics is to achieve collective goals and 
regulate conflict “within a society and among societies.”27 People come together for 
certain purposes, one of which is to manage violence against them. According to Freeden, 
the goal of ideology is maximum penetration of and acceptance from significant intended 
audiences, “to capture control over political language and collective decision-making” to 
improve social life.28 
E. THE GAP AND HOW TO APPROACH THE QUESTION 
Many theorists in the field accept Michael Freeden’s analysis of ideology, and 
this paper leverages his work. Most people who use the term seem to understand it is 
political but fail to place it in the right context or give it the appropriate degree of 
significance. Some use ideology as a partial reference for some political initiative or 
thought-belief. However, ideology is fundamentally a major political term and involves 
behavior.  
It was unclear at the beginning of this project how leaders of social movements 
operationalize ideology. To answer the research question, I took a qualitative heuristic 
research approach. Ultimately, I deconstructed and analyzed the bridge between ideas 
and the organization of goal-directed collective action. I also searched for patterns of 
ideological description.29 
                                                 
27 Freeden, Ideology, 127.  
28 Ibid., 64, 69, 70, 115. Quote on page 69. 
29 Gerhard Kleining and Harald Witt, “The Qualitative Heuristic Approach: A Methodology for 
Discovery in Psychology and the Social Sciences. Rediscovering the Method of Introspection as an 
Example,” Forum: Qualitative Social Research vol. 1, no. 1 (January 2000): article 13, 
http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/1123/2495. 
11 
During that process, my interpretation of information warfare changed. 
Ultimately, the research question was found important, although the question shifted 
from emerging to specifically developing social movements, from resistant movements to 
social movements in general, and to an overall mixed hypothetical argument, the 
soundness of which is based on the persuasiveness of its premises. This paper builds on 
concepts from chapter to chapter. Moreover, many concepts about human behavior stitch 
each section together. Both a valid, reliable model and an argument have emerged in this 
research.  
This thesis does not focus on a single case study but is a comprehensive analysis 
and synthesis of topics bridging ideology and social movement literature. The historical 
references seek to provide contextual validation for the model. Some readers, of course, 
may not accept this thesis’s definition and application of ideology. Its argument is 
scientific yet may be more complex and uncertain than the arguments of other 
quantitative works. I have mitigated this by collecting data on numerous observable 
implications for the theory. 
F. PRELIMINARY CLAIMS 
The following are my claims before completing research on ideology and social 
movement theory. I will discuss how the claims have been modified in the conclusion of 
Chapter III, which will assist readers in understanding the operationalization of 
ideologies as discussed in the final three chapters.  
1. The transformation of consciousness as evidenced by new behavior is a 
way ideology is operationalized.  
2. Identifying totally with a cause is a way ideology is operationalized.  
3. Individuals are more inclined to act after a transformation of 
consciousness. 
4. Individuals are more inclined to act violently after total identification with 
the cause.  
5. In order to shape mass behavior, one must have a grassroots understanding 
of a culture and the logic of its narrative or pre-existing ideology.  
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G. ASSUMPTIONS 
The most significant of my assumptions are listed in this section, to inform the 
reader of ideas that I accepted before, during, and after research analysis.  
1. Social movements and ideologies do not always emerge via in-state actors; 
origins can be traced to external organizers.  
2. Although ideology illuminates problems and offers solutions, alone it is 
not the mechanism that creates us versus them. Instead, identities and 
discourse illuminate sides. So, considering how one interprets messages 
then identifies with an ideology or not is the best way to determine 
ideological friend and foe.  
3. The ultimate goal of ideology is an accepted collective solution and 
strategy to reach the future good society.  
H. CONCLUSION 
This research design turned out to have both depth and breadth, not from similar 
case comparisons but by diving into research segments: ideology, resonance, social 
movement theory, consciousness, communication, and influence. A model, an argument, 
and a few policy recommendations emerge.  
The answer to the original research question—How can developing social 
movements operationalize ideologies?—is a combination of the communication pathway 
and the operationalizing sequence, both of which will be detailed in subsequent chapters. 
The argument itself is a simple syllogism, as follows. If viable ideologies compete 
through the real sociopolitical communication pathway to intended audiences, then the 
operationalization of the social movement’s external and internal considerations 
maximizes its potential for worldview resonance. The findings in this paper argue that it 
is true that ideologies compete through the pathway; therefore, this operationalization 
does indeed maximize resonance potential. This argument is structurally valid. If all the 
premises can be shown to be true, then the argument is sound. My aim is to demonstrate 
why we have strong reasons to conclude that these premises are, indeed, true.  
It is important to security policy analysts, decision makers, and warfighters to 
understand how movements influence ideas. Developing social movements communicate 
across a particular pathway to resonate with intended audiences and ultimately seek to 
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transform adherents into action agents. Hence, social movements operationalize ideology 
by controlling and influencing communicated ideas. Being armed with this information 
allows for anticipating moves, counter-messaging, and organizing war adherents to 
compete in the information domain. The remainder of this thesis covers different types of 
ideologies in Chapter II and resonance and social movements in Chapter III; Chapter IV 
depicts the communication pathway for ideologies; the operationalizing sequence is 
described in Chapter V; and finally, I give policy recommendations in Chapter VI. 
Chapters II and III prepare readers with important concepts on ideologies and social 
movements before reaching the heart of this thesis in Chapters IV and V. 
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II. IDEOLOGIES 
A. INTRODUCTION  
In the first chapter, I outlined the confusion among policy analysts and decision 
makers about understanding ideologies, how ideologies compete in information warfare, 
and how they create visible social movement action. This chapter discusses ideology 
profiles such as liberalism, conservatism, socialism, and totalitarianism. Understanding 
various ideology profiles allows the U.S. security apparatus to better prepare for, identify, 
and compete against threatening social movements. 
Some people may overlook the ability of ideologies to spread from one individual 
to another. Children are born into a sociopolitical world, and as they become aware—and 
this is true in all societies—their first incomplete, or thin, ideology is one of 
authoritarianism.30 Parents carry ideologies and pass their understandings of the world to 
their young. Obedience is one of the main solutions understood by a child. So, each 
person resonates with a pre-existing ideology, which is absorbed at an early age and 
modifies during adolescence, before they join a social movement. However, a child does 
not have an ideology of multifaceted solutions to attain the future good society, so his or 
her ideology is not “fully fledged.”31  
In this thesis, a social movement in its early stages of development is viewed as a 
group ranging in size from two closely tied people up to a significant portion of a nation. 
While an individual might be the first to articulate a particular grievance, ideologies 
develop in a group. They “are produced, directed at, and consumed by groups.”32 
However, it is essential to add that groups can direct ideology recruitment toward 
individuals, as parents do with a child; also, it is possible for one person to articulate a 
new, wholly synthesized ideology for the first time to a group. This is true even if the 
                                                 
30 Freeden, Ideology, 47. 
31 Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, 226. Freeden does not discuss ideologies with children in 
the texts reviewed for this paper. Ideologies like feminism, nationalism, and ecologism are examples of 
“thin” ideologies because they do not offer solutions to all of life’s problems. Fully fledged ideologies offer 
total solutions. Adherents of thin ideologies usually connect to major ideologies.  
32 Ibid., 22.  
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majority of those ideas were freely floating around the society beforehand. Once an 
ideology is explained, there is generally a refinement and strengthening process among 
insiders.  
Freeden’s group-to-group communication concept oversimplifies two key 
experiences: adolescence and recruitment. As with a child, a chance circumstance, or a 
targeted individual, ideologies can be absorbed by one person at a time. Variant 
ideologies or new competing ideologies pass from one person to another, for example via 
direct emails; from one person to a group, for example via a website; or from a group to 
an individual, as seen with some marketing schemes or YouTube-type channels.  
An ideology has a unique configuration of sociopolitical ideas and informs the 
holder’s grievances, solutions, and actions to achieve the ideal society. However, there is 
a paradox when it comes to whether an ideology operationalized a social movement or 
the social movement operationalized the ideology. While people can disseminate, block, 
and contradict ideologies, they too are influenced by an ideology. Is it possible for an 
individual to create a completely new ideology, including all of the ideology’s internal 
ideas? No. Ideologies are not born in a vacuum. They are born into a history, a culture, a 
place, and may be perceived and regarded as new ideas. The ideas, however, are not new 
in total comparative analysis; they combine elements of grievances, solutions, or 
strategies from ideas that already existed, possibly adding in some actual new concepts.  
B. PROFILING IDEOLOGIES 
Any given ideology covers all political concepts.33 Indeed, an ideology holds 
approval or disapproval for every sociopolitical concept the individual carrying that 
ideology is aware of. However, while some concepts will be made central in the person’s 
ideological explanation, others will be marginalized or removed; in fact, most concepts 
are eliminable to any given ideology’s central definition or profile.  
                                                 
33 Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, 83. 
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Critical to this discussion is the concept of decontesting ideas, a process that has 
to do with finding and believing in the meaning of political concepts.34 In the depiction 
of liberalism in the following subsection, for example, I will talk about different 
configurations of concepts within this ideology that hold different meanings to different 
people; these people have decontested political ideas differently. They understand the 
connection of political concepts in different ways, and the words involved mean different 
things to them.35 Decontesting defines the limits and boundaries of ideal concepts, 
eliminating aspects the person in question finds irrelevant and leaving only the ideas she 
values.36  
Freeden explains ideologies as total and general political worldviews. However, 
ideologies are distinguished by ordering similar concepts, decontesting concepts, and 
interpreting messages. The ideational profile of an ideology is a result of decontestation 
of neighboring concepts. Freeden explains, “the decontesting of political concepts 
performed by an ideology is an attempt to legitimate a preferred political order by 
controlling the meaning of key political words.”37 The process of decontesting provides a 
given concept with more determinate meaning. So, ideologies take on “lives of their 
own” based on how concepts are grouped.38  
Of the utmost significance, ideologies are not thought-beliefs but thought-
behaviors and therefore exist both internally and externally to language.39 The difference 
between thought-beliefs and thought-behaviors is that the latter are empirical and involve 
fallible participants, while thought-beliefs can be discussed purely rationally.40 
Ideological language is accountable to reality, as it exists and derives meaning in the real 
                                                 
34 Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, 76. 
35 Ibid., 92. 
36 Ibid., 236. 
37 Ibid., 117.  
38 Ibid., 337. 
39 Ibid., 51. 
40 Ibid., 32. 
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world. Ideologies are the convergence of “meaning and form…presented through a 
communicable and action-inspiring pattern.”41 
Ideologies do not ignore logical adjacencies, as Freeden explains, but rely heavily 
on cultural adjacency, resulting in a mixed variety of reason, emotion, and cultural 
preferences. Ideologies attempt to connect specific political ideas. Initially, they 
determine the meaning of the overall concept, then they give meaning to political terms. 
According to Freeden, ideologies are then best understood as “configurations of 
decontested meanings of political concepts.”42  
People can reflect on and decontest political meanings, but this process is not 
absolute. There is flexibility with political ideas due to changing conceptions of history 
and culture. Then, “ideology is…the macroscopic structural arrangement that attributes 
meaning to a range of mutually defining political concepts.”43  
As noted earlier, ideology is structured as “core, adjacent, and peripheral 
concepts” attempting to map the structural arrangement of these political concepts.44 
These conceptual layers can be imagined as a biological cell: nucleus, cytoplasm, and 
then cell membrane. Alternatively, imagine the content ideas of an ideology as 
furnishings in a dwelling. A kitchen has essential components that are core to it, such as a 
stove and a sink.45 Remove one and the room becomes difficult to recognize. Lose both 
core components, and the room is no longer a kitchen. Hybrid ideologies combine core 
concepts from two families, such as an office-kitchen with bookshelves, a desk, a sink, 
and a stove. Although furniture can be rearranged, being able to identify a room or 
ideology involves a structural perspective and historical family resemblances.46  
Adjacent concepts of how we understand kitchens may include countertops and a 
ceiling, and a periphery concept may be something like a dinner table. In the liberalism 
                                                 
41 Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, 54. 
42 Ibid., 76. 
43 Ibid., 54. 
44 Ibid., 77. 
45 Freeden, Ideology, 61. 
46 Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, 88–89. 
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ideology, for example, from core to periphery, the ideas of liberty, human rights, and 
nationalism are connected.47 The concepts of liberty and democracy, as another example, 
can combine in multiple ways: 1) with close association, democracy may mean self-
determination, and 2) with structural interlinkage, democracy may mean limited popular 
government.48 Adjacencies are culturally relevant concepts and act like fertile soil for 
core concepts.  
The three layers are essential to understanding the structure of ideologies. Certain 
ideas form groupings that distinguish an ideology from other ideologies. Within a given 
ideology structure, adjacent and periphery concepts are more flexible and moveable than 
the core concepts are. Concepts connect among the three layers to form a specific 
ideology conception.  
Within this morphology model, there are two kinds of peripheral concepts: the 
margin and perimeter.49 The margin does not affect the core. Indeed, as Freeden explains, 
it is possible for concepts to be on the margin of the profile purely because a competing 
ideology has forced them onto the agenda. The perimeter periphery concepts are distinct 
from marginal periphery concepts in that they are the ideology’s ideas as they engage 
real-world issues in space and time.50 The perimeter is an essential interface between 
core-adjacent concepts and the real world. Perimeter components are specific ideas, 
policies, and applications, which “serve as the micro-ideological conduits of cultural 
constraints that impact on the macro-ideological structure, as well as conduits of 
structural and logical constraints… through which social facts and concrete events are 
construed.”51 
Some perimeter concepts may actually be marginal, too, as with the concept of 
free trade for 19th-century liberalism before it moved and became an adjacent concept.52 
                                                 
47 Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, 77, 187, 189. 
48 Ibid., 78. 
49 Ibid., 78–80. 
50 Ibid., 78. 
51 Ibid., 80. 
52 Ibid. 
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Within a given ideological morphology, concepts can move between the margin and the 
core. Liberalism, for example, saw the concept of natural rights move outward, and 
fascism saw violence move to the center, as noted by Freeden. However, some ideas are 
fixed. Liberty for liberalism and equality for socialism are ineliminable from their 
respective cores.53 Freeden also explains that concepts can be core in one ideology and 
marginal in another: consider social order for conservatism and liberalism, respectively. 
Adherents to the ideology can stress the importance of different core concepts; Freeden 
illustrates this by describing the debate in socialism over equality, creativity, and welfare. 
Figure 1 illustrates the general core-adjacent-periphery structure of an ideology in 
Freeden’s model as discussed thus far.  
Figure 1.  Depiction of Freeden’s Ideology Profile54 
 
In the model, beliefs within an ideology are identified as routes along core, 
adjacent, and perimeter concepts.55 Some people refer to ideologies as “beliefs,” and this 
                                                 
53 Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, 84, 343. 
54 Adapted from Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, 77. Depiction is my interpretation of 
Freeden’s description. 
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is correct so long as what they mean is holistic belief systems that involve all one’s 
sociopolitical thoughts and behavior in life.  
To help clarify this discussion of how ideas connect and create meaning across 
this model, Table 1 presents a hypothetical core-adjacent-periphery decontestation route. 
As core, adjacent, and perimeter ideas connect—such as human welfare, human rights, 
and the pain and suffering caused by a policy proposal, respectively—we see that these 
ideas in turn become interpreted and valued as human flourishing, rights to social 
services, and undesirable and avoidable pain.  
Table 1.   Example of a Core-to-Periphery National Health Service Belief56 
Connections Decontested and then valued as… 
Core: Human welfare Human flourishing 
Adjacent: Community and responsibility Involving state intervention 
Adjacent: Human rights Rights to services 
Perimeter: Pain caused by a policy proposal Undesirable and avoidable 
Perimeter: Needs Medical services  
 
An important clarification is to show how Heywood’s problem-solution-strategy 
and Freeden’s core-adjacent-periphery ideology explanations overlap. Key to 
understanding the difference between them is that Heywood reviews the nature of 
ideologies (plural), while Freeden investigates the nature of ideology itself. Solutions for 
Freeden are addressed in his core and adjacent concepts, while strategies are addressed in 
the perimeter periphery. Since Freeden usually decontests the ideas within an ideology, 
the images his framework paints of a given ideology seem to be missing problems, but 
most of those ideas have been pushed to the margin periphery or removed from the 
profile. Think of the images created with Freeden’s descriptions as pure form, while the 
problems they address are implied. These ideas can seem invisible without investigation. 
On the other hand, Heywood’s delineation is crude, easily visible, and clunky. This thesis 
                                                                                                                                                 
55 Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, 81. 
56 Adapted from Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, 81. Description reconfigured into this 
format. 
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uses Heywood’s simple definition to explain ideologies and Freeden’s morphology to 
depict them.  
To demonstrate how I meld these two approaches in this thesis, see Figure 2. This 
figure shows how Freeden’s morphology of core-adjacent-periphery aligns with 
Heywood’s working definition of problem-solution-strategy. From top to bottom, 
Freeden’s core concepts depict what Heywood calls solutions, which implies associated 
problems. Next, adjacent concepts depict culturally viable solutions. Then, Freeden’s 
marginal concepts display explicit problems for an ideology. Finally, the morphology 
perimeter depicts policies and programs acted on by ideology members—the strategies. 
Figure 2.  Ideology Alignment of Freeden’s Morphology and Heywood’s 
Definition57 
 
Before describing and depicting some major ideologies, it is important to see how 
intellectuals think of the range of ideology options. Figure 3 shows a traditional left-right 
spectrum of major ideologies. It shows that communism and fascism are totalitarian 
ideologies. Communism touches socialism because it is an extreme version of it. Also, 
there are three moderate ideologies situated in the center of the spectrum. Liberalism is 
pulled closer to socialism because they are both progressive ideologies; conservatism sits 
between ideologies to its left and right, unless one of its neighboring ideologies are 
exerting competitive pressure. Conservatism’s mirroring strategy, as with the other 
ideologies, will be discussed briefly in the following sections.  
                                                 
57 Adapted from Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, 81; Heywood, Political Ideologies, 11. 
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Figure 3.  The Popular Ideology Spectrum58 
 
Employment of ideologies is an aspect of political action and decision making. 
Freeden explains that decisions are made by decontesting the meaning of political terms. 
As such, political thoughts configure decontested concepts.59 Due to personal 
interpretation, choices among political ideas and configurations are not necessarily as 
exclusive as Figure 3 suggests. 
The following sections give a brief description of certain ideology profiles so that 
readers can appreciate the different major worldviews people hold while engaging in 
information warfare. Having an appreciation of different ideologies illuminates biases 
and what different people value in their worlds.  
1. Liberalism and Tensions in America 
In this section, I provide a brief description of a liberalism profile that has evolved 
throughout history and point out some of the embedded conceptual tensions that 
liberalism entails. I go into more detail with liberalism since the intended audience for 
this research is primarily Americans and it is important to consider domestic issues. 
Many Americans resonate with liberalism today. 
John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) explained liberty not only as self-determination but 
subsequently as self-development and imperfect self-realization.60 Mill looked to the 
central concepts of French liberalism to formulate a British interpretation of what is 
                                                 
58 Adapted from Heywood, Political Ideologies, 16. 
59 Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, 5. 
60 Ibid., 147, 168, 175.  
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referred to as 19th-century classic liberalism. Liberalism has many core concepts, which 
allows it flexibility in connecting with other ideas. As listed by Freeden, French 
liberalism’s core ideas were “Liberty, individuality, progress, rationality, the general 
interest, sociability, and constraints on power.”61 However, Mill offered different 
connections and meanings to political ideas, which allowed varieties of liberalism to 
emerge.62 Over time, liberalism demonstrated that it did not overlap (to any significant 
degree that would confuse the families) with later emerging ideologies such as 
conservatism and socialism. 
For a view of Mill’s liberalism, see Figure 4. The figure depicts color-coordinated 
connections of ideas among the core and periphery layers. Liberty, for example, is a core 
concept that has never been eliminated from liberalism. Liberty connects with different 
core concepts. Depicted in red, liberty takes a route connecting with individualism, which 
is also in the core. Liberty further connects with property in the cultural adjacency region 
of the figure and with education in the perimeter of policies and activities. Another 
connection route for liberty, in blue, is with freedom in the core, equality as an adjacent 
concept, and women’s rights in the perimeter-periphery. It is the connection of these 
ideas in profile that determines how one views liberty.63  
                                                 
61 Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, 176. 
62 Ibid., 177, 179. 
63 For a different profile of liberalism, Appendix A depicts Thomas Hill Green’s ideal liberalism, in 
which people develop toward self-realization. The centerpiece of this version is rational liberty, and the 
ideology still holds many core concepts. Although it has evolved, this ideology is the origin of the view still 
held by many academics in America. 
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Figure 4.  Not Completely Classic Liberalism by John Stuart Mill64 
 
The social unit of value in liberalism is the individual. There exists a central 
tension within liberalism that casts the individual in contrasting ways: it describes both 
the uniqueness of each human’s inner qualities and her status as equal to all others in the 
society.65 That society can then be viewed as a collection of individuals competing for 
personal interests and yet born with equal moral worth or human rights. Equal individual 
citizenship, here, implies equal social status. Privileges and advantages based on race, 
gender, or religion are denied by liberals. Equality, usually demands equal opportunity, 
                                                 
64 Adapted from Freeden’s Ideologies and Political Theory, pages on core concepts 144–153, 155, 
165, 178, adjacent concepts 154–164, and periphery concepts 165–167. Colors code linkage of certain 
concepts per Freeden’s explanation. Black text usually indicates the ideas were not readily explained in 
association with other ideas. 
65 Heywood, Political Ideologies, 28. 
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not equal outcomes. However, when it comes to talents, skills, and merit, people are not 
born equal. Equality affords individuals the opportunity to develop their personal unequal 
abilities. Martin Luther King, Jr., for example, deemed social equality unjust, since unlike 
characters are treated wholly—and poorly—due to their black alikeness.66 While liberals 
promote civil-right equalities, they still accept that some of their members have poor 
character. Before demanding equal opportunity, they admit some will be judged as 
underperformers or failures while others will succeed.  
It is important to note, however, that not all Americans hold the liberalism 
ideology. In contrast to the civil rights movement in the United States, decisions by the 
First Americans community illuminate a key distinction with the pan-Indian movement. 
Indian ideology, according to Charles Wilkinson, encompasses the present and layers of 
people and events of the past. The past is important, Wilkinson argues, because Indians 
are “place-based peoples.”67 He explains the Indian worldview holds tribal sovereignty, 
homelands, gods, nature, ceremony, family, and sharing close to its core components.  
Unfortunately, the First Americans did not utilize the communication processes of 
the civil rights movement. They intentionally avoided using the channels and other 
options effective for another movement to raise awareness of specific Indian issues. 
These channels, as will be discussed in Chapter IV, are part of the pathway to increase 
adherents or supporters of a cause. Although the Indians appreciated how the civil rights 
movement brought attention to minority rights, they felt merging the two movements was 
contradictory. Wilkinson’s analysis is, “Blacks were determined to eliminate segregation 
and allow integration; Indians sought to reverse forced assimilation.”68 Native Americans 
wanted sovereignty, while black Americans wanted an equal seat at the shared table of 
sovereignty. Not all inhabitants of the motherland want freedom as it is defined by the 
framers of the Constitution or even the respected Martin Luther King, Jr. Ideologies and 
social movements continue to compete in America. 
                                                 
66 Heywood, Political Ideologies, 33–34. 
67 Charles Wilkinson, Blood Struggle: The Rise of Modern Indian Nations (New York: W. W. Norton 
and Company, 2005), 27. 
68 Ibid., 129. 
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2. Conservatism 
Contrary to popular misconception, conservatism is not about maintaining the 
status quo.69 Rather, properly understood, it is about ensuring change occurs naturally, 
safely, and with respect for the past, as Freeden explains. The progressive drive to 
artificially or humanely control change is the major threat to conservatism today. 
Conservatives, by contrast, do not search for new solutions to social problems.70 Yet the 
conservative becomes systematically active once she does not understand the current 
state of things and is moved to reaction.71 To the conservative, the perceived threat 
“dictates the tempo and the form of the battle.”72 Freeden explains, in the long term, 
conservatism can generally deal with stress better than other ideologies. In the short term, 
however, the flexible strategy depends on its opponents. This means that the more 
threatening progressivisms or totalitarianisms are to the conservative core, the less it can 
adapt, because it becomes more and more rigid. Yet the death of a conservative concept 
does not stop it from re-emerging. As such, conservatism is often an ideology of trial and 
error.73 For a look at the conservatism profile, see Appendix B. It has only four core 
concepts, and the key takeaway is the organic change centerpiece, which is connected to 
many adjacent and perimeter concepts.  
3. Socialism 
The core concepts of socialism only occasionally seem in harmony due to the 
adjacent and peripheral concepts working to contain certain tensions.74 The present and 
future are in a tense relationship.75 This dualism is different than conservatism’s 
mirroring strategy (or its competitive reaction to threatening ideologies on its flanks), in 
that socialism sees a world that ought to be and is attainable. Like conservatism, its range 
                                                 
69 Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, 332–333.  
70 Ibid., 335.  
71 Ibid., 336.  
72 Ibid., 341. 
73 Ibid., 383. 
74 Ibid., 417.  
75 Ibid., 418. 
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is free and unbounded—sometimes in the realm of impossibility—and the cultural 
constraints seen with liberalism and conservatism are usually absent.76 
With socialism, the unit of analysis is the group or community, which usually 
parallels the individual and is sometimes above him.77 Freeden explains, an individual 
can only develop in society. Equality in socialism is not about sameness or identical 
incomes but “commutable human status and worth,” although Marx’s “equality” 
originally referred to the level of political power between the rich and poor.78 Marx 
recognized individuals’ objectively valued needs differently, so he dismissed the concept 
of equal distribution based on merit or achievement.79 Appendix C depicts socialism with 
five core ideas but no centerpiece. Many adjacent and periphery concepts reconfigure to 
sustain its core.  
4. Totalitarianism 
A totalitarian ideology forces on its consumers an artificially inflexible, simplistic 
worldview.80 Totalitarian ideologies are all-encompassing of the private and public 
spheres of human thought and activity, and they entitle the state to regulate all individual 
and social life.81 This section describes how such ideologies are not created in a vacuum.  
Adolf Hitler did not create ideas from nothing. Hitler formed the National 
Socialist German Worker’s Party, or Nazis, by drawing heavily on related ideas 
circulating at the same time. For example, Hitler was influenced by Benito Mussolini’s 
Italian Fascist Party and Friedrich Nietzsche’s view that humans are motivated by the 
will and power of their emotion rather than rationality.82 He was also influenced by 
Charles Darwin’s work on natural selection, which was influencing sociopolitical thought 
                                                 
76 Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, 419. 
77 Ibid., 426. 
78 Ibid., 431. 
79 Ibid., 432. 
80 Ibid., 121. 
81 Freeden, Ideology, 90–91, 121–122. 
82 Heywood, Political Ideologies, 203. 
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at the time, proposing that humanity is about competition and struggle. These ideas and 
others ultimately encouraged the Nazi program of eugenics. 
Heywood lists the central concepts of fascism as: antirationalism (against abstract 
thought as seen during the Enlightenment), struggle, leadership and elitism, socialism, 
and ultranationalism.83 For example, one concept that impacted Nazi action was 
Aryanism, the idea that Germans are the master race—a form of racial nationalism. This, 
too, did not originate in a vacuum; German Aryanism was based on Joseph Arthur 
Gobineau’s racial anti-Semitism doctrine.84 At the same time, Houston Stewart 
Chamberlain had spelled out a history of German misfortune blaming Jews for their loss 
in World War One, humiliation at Versailles, and enslaving the lower and middle classes 
by controlling banking.85 These concepts each influenced the fascist ideology that 
ultimately emerged through Hitler and the Nazi regime. That fascist ideology is best 
characterized as a Manichaean (or good versus evil) worldview, specifically one that 
pitted a racial struggle between Germans and Jews wherein one or the other would 
dominate the world.86  
As with Nazism, religious fundamentalism illustrates that ideologies are not born 
in a vacuum. According to Heywood, the “war on terror” highlights “the emergence of 
new ideological battle lines.”87 This contest is better described as a global campaign 
against those considered terrorists by some who share a different ideology. Religious 
fundamentalism does not separate the church and state.88 Fundamentalism exists in many 
religions. American evangelical Protestants, for example, were the first to use the term 
fundamental in doctrinal pamphlets between 1910 and 1915 claiming the literal truth of 
the bible.89 American fundamentalists denied modern science and despised Darwinian 
                                                 
83 Heywood, Political Ideologies, 200, 202–206. 
84 Ibid., 217. 
85 Ibid., 220. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid., 19. 
88 Ibid., 281. 
89 Karen Armstrong, Fields of Blood: Religion and the History of Violence (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2014), 303. 
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evolutionary social theory about a brutal and godless struggle. Any religion can find 
religious texts to justify killing heretics or infidels.90 Karen Armstrong explains that 
attacking fundamentalists usually causes them to become more extreme, establish new 
doctrine, retreat from the mainstream, and build on the margins.91 Fundamentalists are 
defiant and seek to recover their identities and culture from others.92 Islamic 
fundamentalism, particularly, seeks to construct a theocracy in which the state is based on 
religious principles. As Heywood explains, “Politics, in effect, is religion.”93 
Among violent religious fundamentalist movements, there is a basic pattern: they 
withdraw from mainstream society; they develop a fear of the destruction of their faith, 
life, and lifestyle; then, some groups conduct a counteroffensive to convert others.94 With 
modernization comes secularization: the valuing of rational ideas over religious or sacred 
ones. This shifting of the source of value creates uncertainty for many. Fundamentalism, 
says Heywood, usually emerges “in deeply troubled societies… afflicted by an actual or 
perceived crisis of identity.”95 He notes that fundamentalists search for meaning in a 
world of uncertainty.  
Religious fundamentalism is a major ideology.96 Without drawing a distinction 
between religion and politics, fundamentalism tends toward totalitarianism. Heywood 
explains that the core concepts include religion as politics, anti-modernism, and 
militancy.97 The radical is unwilling to compromise, does not want to extend 
relationships, and is willing to fight. The moderate, on the other hand, is open-minded, 
wants to avoid chaos, is afraid of consequences, and generally wants to avoid a fight.98 
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Figure 5 depicts religious fundamentalism placed between communism and fascism. 
These three totalitarian ideologies are considered extreme compared to the three 
moderates. The left-to-right spectrum is replaced here with a circular configuration. 
Figure 5.  Religious Fundamentalism Over the Extremism Line99 
 
Heywood argues, “political Islam shares much in common with fascism and 
communism, in that each of them promises to rid society of corruption and 
immorality.”100 Fundamentalists are not necessarily scriptural literalists. Modern-day 
religious fundamentalism, socially and psychologically, has been able to mobilize 
activists. Heywood continues, the solutions religious fundamentalism offers are usually 
more straightforward than other competing ideologies, and it is absolute. The rigidness, 
however, can be viewed as a weakness, as it will struggle to provide comprehensive 
solutions to complex social problems—but it will provide solutions. Key to religious 
fundamentalism is that it “is selectively traditional but also selectively modern.”101 
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Heywood says, it resents and envies modernity, despising perceived amoral behavior like 
adultery, homosexuality, prostitution, and pornography but willing to use the Internet, 
build a state, and seek nuclear materials.102 Fundamentalists tend to hold a modern, 
dynamic interpretation of religion that is not stuck in tradition.  
Religious ideas are part of ideologies. If religion is considered a device for social 
organization with collective goals and for regulating conflict within society, there is no 
separation of religion and politics. Christianity and Islam hold global orientations 
claiming to be the true religion and that salvation is reserved for believers only, non-
believers be damned.103 All ideologies have answers to questions about God. 
Islamic fundamentalism traces its roots back to 1928 with the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt.104 Since the 1970s, Islamic fundamentalism has attracted many 
young activists. Sayyid Qutb, who influenced Osama Bin Laden, hated the materialism, 
immorality, and sexual exploits of the West.105 But while Qutb focused on Westernized 
leaders in Egypt and elsewhere, Osama Bin Laden saw the United States as the primary 
target.  
Sayyid Qutb, from the Brotherhood’s propaganda wing, came up with the idea in 
prison that even a Muslim ruler based on the Western model would not work.106 Qutb 
looked at Muhammad’s actions in the Quran and transferred four concepts into his book 
Milestones, which was smuggled out of prison. He wrote about how Muhammad created 
a party, or jamaat, committed to justice; about division of the godly and godless; about an 
Islamic state formed in Medina, Saudi Arabia; and about conducting jihad against Mecca, 
Saudi Arabia.107 Although dormant for a time, Qutb’s work resonated with young 
Brotherhood inmates who followed him. Texts like Milestones continue to influence 
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jihadists today. Ideological texts can sit dormant or float in society until they are 
operationalized by a movement. 
C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter prepared readers with information on major ideologies to provide 
context prior to discussing how an ideology is communicated and influenced by people. 
Ideologies can be absorbed one person at a time, and young teenagers remain a great 
recruiting pool for social movements. Another recurring theme with ideology is prison 
populations; many social movement leaders like Hitler, Nelson Mandela, and Qutb grew in 
influence during their incarcerations.  
Politics is about collective goals and the regulation of conflict. Ideologies contain 
political ideas. Rather than looking at politics as a simple left-right spectrum, in this 
thesis I treat it as a dynamic ring of perpetual competition including religious 
fundamentalism, which I consider a major ideology. Indeed, the inability to see 
relationships with others who hold different ideologies is often the root cause of war.108  
From this view, ideologies are differently configured problem-solution-strategy 
weapons on the information battlefield. Ideologies are not born from nothing. Rather, 
many of their ideas are pulled from competing sociopolitical thoughts and behaviors in 
society. Every ideology holds an opinion on all political matters known to an 
interpretation agent. Armed with this understanding of how ideologies evolve from ideas 
floating in society, in the next chapter I will investigate how they resonate. Ideologies 
vary widely, and the major ideologies act more like central harmonic resonances. 
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III. RESONANCE AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Now that readers should have some sense of what an ideology is and some of the 
major varieties in modern society, I will introduce the concept of resonance operations 
(ops) and describe social movement categories and outputs. Through analogies, concepts 
on consciousness to better understand the complexities with interpretation agents, and an 
example of a social movement recruiting scheme, this chapter prepares readers for 
Chapter IV, which covers communicating ideologies.  
Communicated ideas must travel from one person to the next. Sometimes this 
involves the literal resonance of radio waves, but more significantly, this is about ideas 
resonating in an audience member’s mind. Resonance is about ideas reaching audiences 
and the absorption or acceptance of those ideas. An ideology that is successfully resonant 
impacts someone who more or less agrees with the problem, solution, and strategy the 
ideology puts forth. The major ideologies in particular can be seen as moving between 
people and being held on different frequencies. 
B. ANTENNAS, HARMONICS, AND ANALOGY 
When considering transmitting and receiving ideas, think of humans resonating 
like antennas. The qualities one would look for in a functional antenna are also the 
qualities of people who will resonate with an ideology and pass it to others. Antennas 
work when they radiate (or transmit) and receive power,109 and they function best at 
frequencies near their resonant frequency.110  
Donald Hall explains that resonance delivers energy efficiently, continuously, and 
cooperatively when the driving force runs at nearly the same frequency that the receiving 
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force naturally prefers.111 An example of such resonance is gently pushing someone on a 
swing with the same frequency as its natural motion. 
One can picture ideologies as frequencies; an ideology will only resonate with 
someone who is already thinking or primed to think similarly. At different harmonic 
levels, things do not resonate, since they are on different frequencies. Resonance is not 
about harmony with all others but harmony with like others. See examples in Figure 6. 
Figure 6.  Resonant Harmonics112 
 
Ideologies are oriented to specific sociopolitical actors, though not necessarily the 
ones intended.113 Ideologies are absorbed by people when the packaged concepts 
resonate with them. A group’s perceptions can impose new interpretation rules on an 
ideology, which creates variance, but the new interpretation generally remains within the 
harmonic range. Building upon this analogy, we can argue that unrealistic solutions and 
strategies often result in non-resonance.  
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Resonance can also be seen in applause at a political speech, the roar of the crowd 
at a rally, musical notes with an emotional audience, or screams when it is time to disrupt 
the status quo.114 When it comes to social movements resonating with new recruits, they 
ultimately seek harmony of ideology. The competition of two different harmonics, or 
major ideologies, does not create resonance in one’s mind. Figure 7 illustrates what 
happens when two ideologies, of equal strength, converge on different frequencies. Think 
of this as a pre-existing ideology being exposed to divergent ideas for the first time.  
Figure 7.  Non-Resonant Messaging 
 
Because of this, before sending an ideological message, social movements will 
want to ensure the intended receiver is naturally designed and oriented to receive and 
transmit its ideology. To this end, social movements seek, or at least should seek, a 
compatible receiver design. As with antennas, good targets of ideology will be able to 
receive messages from the social movement and radiate sympathetic messages to others 
to diffuse the ideas. The implication is that communication of ideology does not end 
between sender and receiver, but as with the function of antennas, the messages are 
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passed on to others for additional recruitment for the movement and/or for acceptance of 
the ideology.  
To continue the analogy, the ideal type of power gain for humans to be good 
ideology antennae is directional or high gain. Directional antennas receive and transmit 
with great power within a narrow angle.115 While people are able to receive from 
multiple directions, their attention focuses narrowly. The human antenna will have better 
signal quality if he is oriented toward additional susceptible bystanders and passive 
constituents while not distracted by non-believers. Especially for smaller social 
movements, there is little time and resources to message unwilling and unhelpful 
audiences. In humans, directivity hinges on how distracted people are and their positions 
within a communication network. The intended audience is then one that has better power 
gain than other multidirectional receivers (or distracted people). 
The human antenna should also be efficient at transferring ideas. Efficiency deals 
with the amount of information that is misdirected as messages attempt to pass to the 
intended audience.116 Specific efficiency characteristics that social movements can assess 
are conduction (those who directly allow and transmit the flow of ideas) and reflection 
(those throwing back ideas to some degree without absorbing them). If a social 
movement wants an ideology to spread, it is inefficient to send an idea specifically to 
someone who totally disagrees with an ideological message. This, like all characteristics, 
can be tested and observed. 
The next feature is to have a tolerable impedance level and match.117 Impedance 
is about natural imperfections with receiving and sending messages, such as, in the 
human antenna case, forgetful minds. This is different than inefficient disagreement of a 
message and deals with mental capacity. To transfer power maximally requires matching 
the impedance between sender and receiver. For example, an ideological message should 
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be clear and concise about what the grievances, solutions, and plans are to improve the 
world. By sending a message that an audience understands and can carry, impedance is 
matched. In such a case, a resonant ideology is easy for people to understand and repeat 
to others. 
A fourth feature has to do with matchable frequency within bandwidth, the range 
of frequencies within which an antenna conforms to a certain standard. With humans, this 
idea of bandwidth means the resonant ideology does not need to match perfectly between 
sender and receiver, only sufficiently to achieve the goal. When social movements see the 
expected or desired behaviors in their potential recruits, these are indicators of adequate 
resonance for a given message—though, of course, false positives can sometimes occur. 
To resonate with an audience, there are two options: send random messages to resonate 
with random audiences or determine which messages resonate with a certain audience 
and then prepare resonating messages aligned to them. The latter approach is more likely 
to find matchable frequencies, which is a key requirement for passing messages.118 
Horizontal polarization is the final feature of this antenna analogy. The antenna’s 
orientation determines the direction a wave it transmits travels. An antenna, with its 
upright stance, emits a wave that flows parallel with the Earth’s surface to reach other 
devices; similarly, ideal (or healthy) audiences are oriented toward and engage other 
humans, and the ideologies we transmit impact other human interpretation agents.119  
C. INTERPRETATION AGENTS 
If a receiving antenna is the person who interprets political ideas, it is important to 
look at how that person’s mind processes information. Richards Heuer argues that the 
human mind simplifies reality, so perception is influenced by one’s experiences, values, 
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and roles and the stimuli received by the senses.120 Operating from a given mindset is 
neither bad nor good but unavoidable.  
1. Perception 
Perceptions are quickly created but resist change. Once someone forms an image, 
future information is assimilated into the existing model.121 Heuer explains, “despite 
ambiguous stimuli, we form some sort of tentative hypothesis about what it is we are 
seeing. The longer we are exposed to the ambiguous data, the greater confidence we 
develop in this initial and perhaps erroneous impression.”122 It can take a great deal of 
data to change someone’s mind. 
2. Consciousness 
Consciousness is subjective experience, or what being is like. In the study of 
skilled motor actions, Susan Blackmore outlines five categories of consciousness in 
actions: spinal reflexes, such as growing hair; usually unconscious actions, like a beating 
heart, which can sometimes come under conscious control; conscious skilled actions, like 
bike riding, which become easy or automatized with practice; skilled actions that can be 
controlled or passive, like driving a car; and actions that seem always to be conscious, 
like moral decision making.123 Perception, too, can be conscious or unconscious. 
Subjectivity is a key difference between unconscious and conscious processes.124 
Using ideology is a conscious undertaking. Ideology is related to consciousness because 
both are about how people perceive the real world and act accordingly. 
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D. SOCIAL MOVEMENT COMPONENTS 
Analyzing social movement categories provides context on whom and why 
groups may choose to leverage ideologies. While major ideologies are maintained by 
professional political thinkers or institutional political organizations such as interest 
groups and parties, this study highlights a third group: partly noninstitutional social 
movements and their organizations born from the mass population. It is likely the 
producers within the mass population use multiple interpretations of a creative ideology 
to compete.125 Doug McAdam and David Snow define a social movement “as a loose 
collectivity acting with some degree of organization, temporal continuity, and reliance on 
noninstitutional forms of action to promote or resist change in the group, society, or 
world order of which it is a part.”126 It is a group of people who engage in joint action for 
a purpose.  
Social movements are carriers or vehicles of change.127 They are not trends like 
industrialization or urbanization, changes in public opinions or beliefs, mass migrations 
like a land rush, or interest groups like the National Rifle Association.128 The key 
difference between social movements and interest groups is that interest groups are 
embedded in the institutionalized policy-making system of legitimate actors and have 
means such as lobbying.129 Social movements, by definition, exist outside these 
institutionalized systems. 
Formal organizations serve as the public faces of social movements, and at least 
one is essential for activity.130 An organization carries and dramatizes the issues 
important to the movement’s members.131 Social movement organizations carry 
                                                 
125 Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, 124. 
126 Doug McAdam and David A. Snow, “Introduction,” in Readings on Social Movements: Origins, 
Dynamics, and Outcomes, ed. Doug McAdam and David A. Snow, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 1.  
127 Ibid., 1, 3. 
128 Ibid., 3–4. 
129 Ibid., 1, 3–4. 
130 Ibid., 4. 
131 Ibid., 4–5. 
42 
ideologies and operationalize those ideologies to allow the movement and its worldviews 
to survive. When there is widespread political dissent in a population, the environment 
simmers with ideological competition. This offers a movement options for how to 
operationalize political ideas. While social movements can coerce and offer incentives to 
gain public compliance, an ideology might be sufficient to carry a movement toward its 
goals. In the social movement context, there are three categories of relevant actors: 
protagonists, antagonists, and bystanders.132 As Figure 8 depicts, the three types of 
protagonists are all supporters and have interests represented by the movement. 
Figure 8.  Social Movement Protagonist Actors133 
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In Figure 8 some conscience adherents will not benefit directly from activities, as 
McAdam and Snow explain.134 They also explain most adherents are from the 
constituency (or resource base), and only some are very active. Some of the constituency 
members do not provide direct support to the adherents, and not all constituents will 
benefit from the movement. Finally, McAdam and Snow explain that there are many 
free-rider protagonists. 
Antagonists are the adversaries and opposition of the movement or change. They 
are “unsympathetic to the movement’s objectives” and “perceive the movement’s 
interests as antithetical.”135 Counter-movements are likely to emerge in an attempt to stop 
or neutralize the social movement. There is no rule that says true antagonists cannot be 
turned to support the social movement, but this seems a very difficult undertaking and 
probably includes a transformative experience. However, according to McAdam and 
Snow, while bystanders are initially uninterested and indifferent to the issues at stake, it 
is possible to activate their interest and lead them to be active in the movement. For 
example, bystanders may orient toward the issues when their routines are disrupted. 
Then, through an information mechanism, they can be transformed into constituents or 
adherents. 
Social movements are just one practice of collective action, which is explained by 
McAdam and Snow as “any goaldirected activity jointly pursued by two or more 
individuals.”136 Collective action overlaps some with collective behavior, which is when 
people team together to solve problems, so “just as social movements are a form of 
collective action, so they also constitute a species of collective behavior.”137 Figure 9 
illustrates the nesting of social movements. Key to social movement activity is that it is 
often outside legal institutional means, while collective action is usually institutional. 
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Social movements also pursue goals to change something in society, while collective 
behavior is about continual activity without collective goals.  
Figure 9.  Distinguishing Social Movements138 
 
Figure 10 displays a conceptual plan of how ideological social movement 
stakeholders shift via a social movement resonance recruitment scheme. Antagonists are 
high-impact actors opposing the efforts of the social movement. They can be legitimate 
governments or other actors. Little effort should be directed at shifting these non-
believers who are highly non-resonant with the protagonist cause. However, especially 
with natural disasters, humanitarian opportunities should always be considered in order to 
win antagonists over or at least try to persuade them to be neutral. It is economical to 
think of non-believer recruitment efforts last (if at all); I represent this by using a smaller 
arrow for those efforts. Bystander frequency would look at least one harmonic higher or 
lower than social movement protagonists and antagonists. To move them into the 
constituent category, a disruptive event or message is likely required to synchronize the 
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two different oscillators. The social movement can attempt to drop to the bystander 
harmonic and then eventually bring the whole group’s oscillation into tune with the social 
movement’s original frequency. Believers live within the same harmonic range as the 
social movement, and the oscillation effort of the movement’s recruiters and leaders is 
high in this category to move them to supportive action. Social movement effort toward 
believers can result in direct support to the cause and members or turn them into 
adherents. The most committed block of true believers is in the high-impact category for 
the social movement’s goals, and little energy is required by the organization to gain 
action here. 
Figure 10.  Shifting Stakeholders139 
 
Different movements, of course, have different goals. The visible outputs of a 
social movement’s recruitment strength are subordinate to the movements’ organizational 
goals and those of the relevant ideology. Visible recruitment outputs include the slight 
chance of turning non-believers into bystanders or isolating non-believers. At the same 
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time, movements may attempt to activate bystanders into constituents. They may also 
seek to turn these constituent supporters into adherents who at least participate a little. 
Even better for movements is recruiting busy activists. Aside from looking at recruitment 
numbers in certain groups or the activities conducted to support or execute movement 
goals, the ultimate category for movements are the adherents who are willingly violent, if 
necessary. These outputs entail recognizable behaviors and population numbers. Figure 
11 shows a slight variation from Figure 10—instead of considering opportunities to shift 
non-believers, social movements can attempt to isolate them. 
Figure 11.  Isolating Antagonists 
 
A social movement may create a recruitment scheme in order to diffuse an 
ideology. However, in the absence of planning it may happen naturally. Sean Everton 
argues that social formations result from repeated interactions among actors. Such 
formations, “take on a life of their own, follow their own logic, and cannot be reduced to or 
explained by their constituent parts even though they remain dependent on those parts.”140 
This is analogous to hydrogen and oxygen, which do not share the wetness characteristic 
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but combine to create water.141 Water is something beyond its components, but dependent 
on them. Similarly, social movements depend on ideology and action from constituents and 
adherents for survival.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Ideologies will resonate with an interpretation agent depending on his subjective 
views of the world. Before determining many of the factors that influence thoughts and 
behaviors, this chapter describes features of antennas as an analogy that can be applied to 
humans to determine if receivers are temporarily resonant to senders and their messages.  
After deeper research into the concepts of ideology, some of my preliminary 
claims deserve amendment. Regarding claim one, the transformation of consciousness as 
evidenced by new behavior does not seem to be a way ideology is operationalized but 
perhaps a result of operationalizing ideology. After consideration, transformation of 
consciousness seems an effect of offering competing ideas, and both may cause action. It 
seems backwards to think people’s consciousness transforms to get ideas to work for 
them. It is similar with the second preliminary claim: identifying totally with a cause 
seems to be a result of operationalizing ideology, not, as I once thought, a way ideology 
is operationalized.  
Nothing in the literature for this research reverses claims three and four that 
individuals are more inclined to act after a transformation of consciousness and they are 
more willing to act violently after total identification to the cause. However, claim three 
should be refined to a more restricted claim. To wit: individuals are more inclined to act 
if a transformation of ideology moves them from bystanders to the constituency and even 
more likely if these believers become adherents. The changing of someone’s 
consciousness about the world does not mean that she will act for a movement or an 
ideology. Also, claim four seems correct: individuals are more inclined to act violently 
after total identification with the social movement cause, though a detailed account of 
violence would include discussion on psychological factors beyond the scope of this 
project. Finally, claim five, about understanding a culture at the grassroots level to be 
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able to influence mass behavior, subtly suggested a divergence between narrative and 
ideology within culture. However, this study suggests they are closely linked, so I now 
modify this claim: in order to shape mass behavior, one must have a grassroots 
understanding of a culture, its history, its place of audience, and the logic of its 
ideological narrative. I discuss narratives in Chapter V, but first, the next chapter depicts 
the environment for viable ideological competition. 
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IV. THE IDEOLOGY COMMUNICATION PATHWAY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the first half of this thesis’s main argument, namely, that 
viable ideologies compete through a communication pathway between senders and 
interpretation agents. The second half of the argument will be covered in the next chapter. 
Understanding the communication pathway for ideologies can inform policy makers, 
strategy analysts, and decision makers about how ideologies diffuse from one person to 
the next. It does not, however, completely answer the operationalizing question driving 
this thesis’s main research question. This chapter seeks to establish the environmental 
limitations on viable ideologies, the three roots of ideologies, four strategies of 
ideological messaging, and the five pathway processes that social movements can choose 
in an attempt to send resonant ideology. Briefly stated, the chapter explains that before 
movements can effectively operationalize ideologies, they must first understand the 
communication environment, the three types of ideological competitors, the offensive and 
defensive critiques about older worldviews, and five decision points to create influential 
messages. All of these elements combine to describe how viable ideologies compete in 
the real sociopolitical world. 
If ideologies are not born from nothing, then they emerge from and are 
constrained by society and other factors. Within that framework, ideologies can be 
transmitted whole or in fragments. A social movement has many options with which to 
compete with pre-existing ideologies that are floating and passing through the population 
in a given society. Developing social movements rebuild, modify, create, and discredit 
ideologies by communicating political ideas through a selective pathway to resonate with 
intended audiences.  
B. LIMITATIONS 
The real sociopolitical world of competing ideologies is limited by four factors: 
history, culture, place, and partial logic. To start, the environment for viable ideologies is 
constrained by history and culture. This is a significant point for competitors. In the 
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process of understanding, there are two fused yet tense time horizons: the enquirer and 
the historical situation of the enquirer.142 According to Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, 
a “test for a propensity to think in terms of time is thus the frequency with which one 
reads or hears about some alleged change, pauses to recall the past, and says, ‘But that is 
nonsense!’”143 Additionally, culture is transmitted through the Internet, television, 
newspapers, radio, and articles.144 Ideologies, argues Freeden, “acquire meaning not only 
through historically transferred traditions of discourse, and not only through the pluralist 
disparities of culture, but also through their particular location within a constellation of 
other political concepts.”145 The extent to which a movement can change the expectation 
of an audience is limited by the audience’s cultural predispositions.146 No radical idea of 
a utopian perfect society in which all people live peacefully and without political 
competition is going to be accepted by many people. People will think such solutions are 
infeasible, and therefore they will eliminate them as non-viable parts of the ideology. 
Historical continuity has an important organizing role, since ideologies appear as “lived 
traditions of political thought.”147  
The third boundary is place, which is not necessarily geographically specific. A 
prison is the type of place in which grievances can breed and develop, depending in part 
on inmate treatment and privileges as well as the reasons for incarceration. In many 
cases, local placement is more significant than the surrounding geography—there are 
certain similarities between prisons regardless of geographic setting. The place in which 
people find themselves will have incredible influence on the perceived possibility of 
ideas. A person living in a slum is not primed to accept advanced urban solutions and will 
therefore take longer to convince. If a person does not believe that a political solution is 
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within the confines of his placement on earth, he will not hold it as a viable option in his 
ideology. Place is similar to history in this sense—a person from a time in which a given 
solution is not recognized as an option will not quickly accept that solution. 
Partial logical consistency is the fourth constraining element. Logic can support 
an ideology, but illogic does not destroy it. However, a degree of logic is required. The 
failure of most ideologies to maintain perfect internally consistent logic does not tend to 
make them worse political thoughts.148 This is one of Freeden’s most significant points. 
Ideologies are understood by “appreciating the interaction between logic, culture, and 
emotion or, put differently, between form and meaning.”149 Freeden’s thesis “is that 
rigorous, pertinent, and challenging political analysis can be the outcome of identifying 
the basic features and units of political thinking as they appear to us. We require more 
subtle and sophisticated means of examining the contents and forms of political thought” 
than pure logic.150 Freeden explains that ideologies do not deal with objectivity and 
certainty, they deal with subjectivity and interpretation. What all this means for the model 
developed here is that cultural adjacency restricts logical adjacency within given 
ideologies, as will be discussed in the following sections.151 However, an ideology 
cannot be completely illogical to its adherents if it is to survive.  
C. THE ROOTS OF IDEOLOGIES 
Throughout the communication pathway are three roots of ideologies: the pre-
existing, the intended, and the unintended meanings. A new ideology starts at the 
beginning of the pathway, while old ideologies can be found floating around at different 
points. Within the environment of viable ideologies are two primary distinct roots of 
sociopolitical ideas of one’s world: the pre-existing (or old) and the competing varieties 
(or new). In 1971, Antonio Gramsci would have used the terms organic and nonorganic, 
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and George Rude in 1980 would have used inherent and derived.152 The point here is that 
potential constituents do not have a blank slate on which new ideas can be written. These 
two roots are the competitor archetypes, but as will be explained later, there is one more 
subtype of competitor. The pre-existing ideology root has an inertia of its own for many 
people. This is the way that all people view the world before someone shares a new 
insight (problem, solution, or strategy) with them. Pre-existing ideologies are both free 
and controlled. They are free in the sense that they float at different points in the 
pathway, beyond total observation of many people, operating naturally; they are 
controlled in the sense that humans maintain a degree of oversight over their messages 
and the mechanisms (natural or created) they use to deliver those messages. 
The second root of ideology, intended meanings, emerges in social movement 
organizations, and its members’ shared ideology begins to compete with the pre-existing 
ones. Competing groups can discover and recommend a variety of solutions, so even 
billions of ideologies are possible. However, most individualized ideologies will gravitate 
to one of the major families for complete solutions to the world’s problems, though they 
may have minor differences. The social movement organization (SMO), or the cadre that 
sets the direction for the movement, can survey the people to understand closely what 
variety of grievances they hold and work to synthesize the issues, or alternatively, it can 
assume it knows the people’s issues and begin to represent and dramatize the 
constituency without surveys. Meanwhile, though the pre-existing ideology is locked and 
loaded to influence current audiences, it will also be working against the emerging social 
movement’s new ideas. Depending on the competing ideology imagined by a social 
movement, the message will have one of two typical ideology strategies: offensive or 
defensive. An offensive strategy will be one of three varieties: to rebuild a previous 
ideology—to return the world order to the way it was in the past; to modify a previous 
ideology with a new factional interpretation; or to innovate a new ideology. The 
defensive strategy involves discrediting the SMO’s ideology competition. While 
offensive strategies will always have an element of discrediting competition, it is possible 
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for an SMO to have a purely defensive strategy message that seeks only to discredit 
without offering solutions to the issue (although receivers may fabricate implied 
solutions).  
The third root of ideology, a derivative of a social movement’s competing view, is 
unintended meanings. This, like drifting pollen, is naturally radiated by a social 
movement’s political messages. An ideological tradition includes various statements by 
the movement’s contributors, and as a consequence the profile of that ideology will have 
various arrangements. A social movement is formed by “separate individual 
consciousnesses.”153 This brings up two points. First, the ideas themselves can have 
multiple open-ended connotations. Second, people interpret ideas in different ways, 
although in ideology they will not be able to stretch these interpretations beyond the 
limits of their historical and cultural understandings of the world. This is not to claim, for 
example, that Albert Einstein was just as limited as any other. But Einstein was anchored, 
as brilliant as he may have been, by his past and culture. This third root is demonstrated 
in two ways. First, all ideas are open to multiple interpretations, because all people have 
personal identity, self-consciousness, private emotions, and personal biases and they 
make sense of the world by drawing on unique experiences. Second, all ideologies have 
multiple ideas about grievances and helpful solutions on the three different layers of 
periphery, adjacent, and core concepts. Therefore, all ideologies will always be open to 
multiple interpretations.  
The discussion thus far helps illuminate that there are three analytical pieces in the 
categorical logic of an ideology: First, it has limitless forms and a singular meaning is 
impossible, explains Freeden. Second, culture, history, and place constrict the range of 
meanings for a given ideology. And third, ideologies attempt “to behave as if meaning 
could be made determinate.”154  
If this argument is not convincing, consider that according to Freeden ideologies 
have at least 41 different functions or roles. To list just a few of these functions, 
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ideologies order the social world and historical time, decontest competitive meanings of 
concepts, recruit based on the language employed, direct political understanding, and 
emerge among competing groups.155 According to Freeden, “ideologies perform a range 
of services, such as legitimation, integration, socialization, ordering, simplification, and 
action-orientation, without which societies could not function adequately, if at all.”156 
The numerous roles of ideologies cannot be completely controlled by a single group. For 
this reason, when a social movement sends an ideological message through the 
communication pathway, an unintended meanings root is also planted.  
Another analogy is that an ideology is like a tree seed. With fertile soil and the 
right amount of nutrients and energy, the idea blossoms into something unrecognizably 
different from the seed it once was. Each tree grows in unique leaning and twisting ways 
due to many conditions. The branches will vary so much that no two trees look exactly 
the same. Additionally, like pollination, other unintended ideas will spread beyond the 
original ideas. All three roots of ideology are different types of vehicles for ideologies to 
compete and reach potential audiences. 
D. COMMUNICATION AND RESPONSE 
In this section I describe how ideologies successfully pass from one person to the 
next. As with the principles of resonance, Wilbur Schramm describes communication as 
“commonness with someone.”157 It attempts to share not just information but ideas and 
attitudes.158 According to Schramm, communication passes through someone and is 
changed by his or her interpretations, habits, abilities, and capabilities; the essence of 
communication is the sender and receiver being tuned together with particular messages.159 
The three minimum elements of communication are source, message, and destination: 
Sources can be individual people “speaking, writing, drawing, gesturing” to one another, or 
organizations such as newspapers, publishing houses, television stations, or movie 
                                                 
155 Freeden, Ideology, 42, 54, 70, 77, 79. 
156 Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, 22. 
157 Schramm, “How Communication Works,” III-I-1. 
158 Ibid., III-I-6. 
159 Ibid., III-I-1. 
55 
studios.160 A message is any “signal capable of being interpreted meaningfully.”161 The 
destination can be an individual using her senses, a member of a group like an audience, 
crowd, or mob, or a mass audience such as television viewers.  
1. Encoding and Decoding 
In Wilbur Schramm’s model, which I follow here, the source and encoder are one 
person, while the decoder and destination are another.162 Encoding can also happen 
within groups. Decoding, however, involves individual interpretation. Schramm 
compares encoding to a microphone and decoding to an earphone. “The source… tries to 
encode in such a way as to make it easy for the destination to tune in the message—to 
relate it to parts of his experience.”163 The nervous system provides mediatory responses 
that recognize learned signs.164 These mediatory responses are the meaning the sign has 
for someone. Figure 12 illustrates how a source encodes an ideology before sending to a 
destination, who decodes the information. 
Figure 12.  Ideology in the System of Human Communication165 
 
2. Effective Messages 
Knowing how ideas go from sender to receiver and how they are interpreted, it is 
clear that messages must be crafted carefully in order to have their intended effect. 
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Schramm discusses effects and expectations in communication. He claims when “we 
insert an advertisement in a newspaper, put up a sign, explain something to a class, scold 
a child, write a letter, or put our political candidate on radio or television, we are making 
a prediction about the effect communication will have.”166 Our predictions are not always 
correct. People can identify the ideological meanings intended by the social movement, 
but they also interpret things that were unintended.  
Schramm argues that there are four “conditions that must be fulfilled if the message 
is to arouse its intended response.”167 First, it must be crafted to capture someone’s 
attention; second, it must refer to experiences common to the source and receiver to 
transfer meaning; third, it must “arouse personality needs in the destination and suggest 
some ways to meet those needs”; and finally it must offer a way to achieve the needs 
suitable for the destination’s situation.168 According to Schramm, using the lens of this 
“interaction of message, situation, personality, and group” is the only way to attempt to 
predict effects in mass communication.169  
Knowing one’s audience is a priority.170 What they are scanning for in the 
environment affects the process of gaining their attention. Social movements select 
messages for which the impression fits the needs or interests of certain people.171 
Successful messages arouse a driving force in people. They make them feel that an action 
can satisfy a need or tension.  
Each of the three roots of ideologies passes through a mostly invisible system 
which transfers ideas from one interpretation agent to another. Ideologies can go through 
this process artificially or naturally—with or without human intention and control. The 
process can last a fraction of a second or take years to reach and convince intended 
audiences. Often, we think of ideologies as emanating from written documents, but 
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proximate verbal communication in social relationships is far more influential, trusted, and 
likely to produce feedback. An ideological message intended to resonate with its audience 
is configured such that it can pass through the system without being disrupted or blocked.  
E. THE IDEOLOGY PATHWAY 
As previously discussed, the three roots of viable ideologies are constrained by four 
environmental factors: history, place, culture, and partial logical consistency. Recall that 
ideologies can arise from any of the three roots (the pre-existing, the social movement’s 
intended ideology explanation, and the social movement’s unintended mixture of its 
explanation with other ideas). Pre-existing ideology messages float in society and can be 
found waiting to be operationalized at any of five stages in the communication process 
discussed in Figure 13. A social movement’s competing ideology is formed as individuals 
with collective grievances connect. It has four intended input critiques or strategies that it 
can employ to compete with the pre-existing ideology. Three of them are offensive: 
rebuilding an old ideology, offering a new factional interpretation or modification of the 
pre-existing ideology, or innovating a new ideology. The remaining strategy is defensive: 
attempting to discredit the pre-existing ideology or its adherents. The third root type of 
ideology, the unintended ideology, arises due to a lack of control when a social movement 
does not know exactly how interpretation agents will interpret messages or how unforeseen 
problems, solutions, and strategies may mix with those messages.  
As seen in the following model (Figure 13), social movements send these 
competing ideology roots and strategies through a communication pathway toward 
intended audiences. The five stages these ideas will pass through are what I call (1) 
attribution menu, (2) deception junction, (3) channel menu, (4) influence mechanism, and 
(5) message form (see Figure 13). Each of these stages are discussed in detail following the 
model. Once through the communication pathway, ideologies impact interpretation groups 
or individuals. The result is one of the three different visible outputs: inaction, violence, or 
non-violent recruitment and action. These outputs were described in the “shifting 
stakeholders” recruitment scheme.  
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1. Attribution Menu 
Beginning at the left side of the model, the attribution menu represents a decision 
point for the social movement. It is the phase in which an idea originator or sender 
decides how overt the message should be. To borrow terms from Frank Goldstein and 
Daniel Jacobowitz’s discussion of propaganda, the message can be white, gray, or black. 
White, or overt, communication is when ideas are sent in the open and the sender is 
readily apparent; it is when “the source takes responsibility for it.”172 In gray and black 
communications, the sender is not acknowledged. Gray attribution is an idea “that is 
distributed without an identifiable source”;173 black attribution is an idea “produced by 
one source that purports to have emanated from another source.”174 Therefore, the 
perceived credibility and degree of trust in the sender or claimed sender affects how 
trusted the idea will be—but only if receivers can figure out who they believe authored 
the message. 
2. Deception Junction 
The second stage, the deception junction, involves a decision about whether or not 
to deceive the intended audience. It is structured much like attribution menu, but instead 
of ownership of the message, it deals with the truth or falsity of the idea itself. The first 
option is a message the sender believes to be true; however, people can deceive 
themselves, so deception remains a possibility even with honest ideas. With a white idea, 
the sender intends a completely and objectively truthful message. This does not 
necessarily extend to all truth details beyond the context of the message. Usually, white 
ideas are facts and observations, though they can be honestly described feelings or 
projected emotions too. As Carnes Lord argues, “conveying of purely factual information 
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under certain circumstances can have powerful psychological effects.”175 The sender 
intends white ideas to be honest. Richards Heuer says intended white ideas imply a causal 
link between evidence and the explanation.176 The sender expects the receiver to 
understand this connection. 
As defined by Walter Jajko, “Deception, ultimately, is the misrepresentation of 
the operative meaning of critical information by the manipulation of the adversary’s 
perceptions through the management of his expectations.”177 A risk in choosing the 
deception route is that one’s own policy makers and intelligence assets can be fooled as 
well. Jajko explains that deception substitutes a purpose-driven idea for the truth. A gray 
idea is one that is partly true, intentionally withholding some elements of the whole truth 
that matter in context. A gray idea discloses half-truths supported by proof signals.178  
A black deception idea is one that is intentionally a lie, partly or wholly, but is 
offered as truth. Abram Shulsky claims, “Deception depends, ultimately, on implanting in 
the target’s mind a view of reality that is at odds with the truth.”179 Walter Jajko agrees, 
adding, “Deception can be based on truth or falsehood or truth and falsehood.”180 Finally, 
and perhaps obviously, the greater the realism required to support a deception, the more 
time and effort is needed to set it up and continue to fool people for the long term.181  
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Donald Daniel and Katherine Herbig offer two deception efforts: “ambiguity-
increasing” and “misleading.”182 To them, deception encompasses lying (making untrue 
statements), artifice (manipulating context), and concealing a truth. It only needs to 
sustain a lie long enough to benefit the deceiver. They claim the three aims of deception 
are first to condition someone’s beliefs; next, to influence her actions; and ultimately for 
the intended audience to act in favor of the deceiver’s goals. This suggests that if the 
ideology alone does not gain adherents to the social movement’s cause, a deceptive hook 
may be an initial step to gaining compliance.  
3. Channel Menu 
The third stage involves the social movement selecting a certain channel to carry 
an ideological message to its intended audience. A channel is a way information reaches 
an audience.183 The channel menu includes but is not limited to the Internet, television, 
radio, face-to-face interaction, events (staged, natural, or imagined), cell phones and other 
handheld devices, papers and printing presses, satellites, schools, churches, the Justice 
Department, the media, tradeshows, families, other institutions, etc. Just as with people, 
trust is required of channels. People do not accept information at a church if they do not 
trust the minister or the institution itself. Some will not trust certain frequencies on a 
radio or programs on a television. Face-to-face interaction remains the leading influencer 
and can be accomplished by politicians, regular citizens, and spies.184 A channel carries 
many signals in parallel from source to destination.185 Even weapons can channel a 
violent and often lethal message. Secondary meanings can be conveyed with sarcasm, 
humor, or doubt.  
                                                 
182 Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig, “Propositions on Military Deception,” in Strategic 
Military Deception, ed. Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), 5, 
6. 
183 Shulsky, “Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception,” 19. The full scope of the Internet as a 
major channel of information is beyond this thesis, yet it includes anything from fiber-optic cables to 
emails, blogs, news agencies, social media, and display screens. 
184 Daniel and Herbig, “Propositions on Military Deception,” 9. 
185 Schramm, “How Communication Works,” III-I-8. 
 62
Of particular importance is that an event can be staged, such as asking a celebrity 
to speak at a gathering or when the president speaks behind a podium. More subtly, a 
staged event can be a preplanned encounter made to look coincidental and natural; think 
of figuring out the frequency with which someone goes to a coffee shop and then using 
that information to decide when and where to “bump into” them. Ideological events can 
also occur without any prior planning, such as when two civilian strangers are genuinely 
relaxing at a bar and then share their views about the world. Imagined events may include 
a hypothetical scenario presented by a professor in a philosophy or economics class.  
Channels can also be denied to people. Denial is an attempt to block information 
channels with truth signals to an adversary in order to delay reactions.186 Closed 
societies, like North Korea, regulate as many channels as possible.187 So, denial blocks 
channels that transmit signals describing the true situation. Successful denial forces 
people to rely on other channels, which are more likely to be vehicles of deception.188 
Figure 14 displays different ways messages can travel through channels. 
Possibility A (along the left side of the figure) shows an ideology received practically 
intact; here, the interpreted or decoded message is very similar to the one intended. 
However, with B, a completely different idea is decoded—one that shows practically no 
resemblance to the one intended. In instance C in the figure, an ideology is received, 
partly or wholly, but so are so many other competing ideas that the receiver decodes a 
scrambled message. The ideology is embedded in this confusion, and it is difficult to then 
encode the original message to pass it on to others. Next, in D, an ideology impacts the 
receiver and is totally dismissed, as is expected with non-believers. Finally, in E, the 
ideology never reaches its intended audience, perhaps because the channel has been 
destroyed or the ideology is somehow diverted into a different direction. I do not see any 
reason to believe any of these possibilities is universally more likely than the others, 
since reception of an ideology always hinges on the relevant history, culture, acceptable 
logic, and place in which the interpretation agent is sitting. 
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Figure 14.  Transmission and Reception Possibilities of Ideology189 
 
4. Influence Mechanism 
The next stage, in the model depicted in Figure 13 is the Influence Mechanism. 
This stage involves selecting schemes on how to enhance the effectiveness of ideological 
messages. This means before a social movement sends a message direct to an intended 
audience, it can instead decide to send the message to someone else or leverage an 
influence technique to pressure another’s behavior. Influence is underlined by 
relationships, but when it comes to ideology messaging, relationships can be unreliable—
most people do not know the loyalties of an “agent of influence.”190 In this section, in 
order to better explain what is occurring at this juncture in the model, I briefly discuss 
Robert Cialdini’s six influence principles or tactics, which “can be employed for good or 
for ill.”191 This means that these six principles can be employed in the negative as well. 
For example, the liking principle says that a person who is well liked has a higher chance 
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of influencing others. To think of this in the negative, consider a person who is disliked—
he has a smaller chance of influence and can create opposite effects. So, a social 
movement can leverage the liking technique in the negative as well by having disliked 
people send messages. In fact, a social movement may try to discredit the reputation of 
someone who was once liked in order to alienate his or her followers. Influence shortcuts 
prepare people for compliance decisions.192 Modern-day automaticity, as Cialdini 
explains, facilitates decision without considering all the relevant available information in 
an increasingly information-rich world. This is one avenue through which, as Cialdini 
warns, people can be “exploited by clever others.”193  
The positive versions of Cialdini’s six influence techniques are reciprocation, 
authority, liking, scarcity, social proof, and commitment and consistency. First, the 
reciprocation rule demands repayment in kind for what someone else has provided.194 
This can be a gift in exchange for movement activity. Second, Cialdini explains the 
principle of authority, which an influencer can use to manipulate others, is ingrained 
obedience to a perceived higher power. He notes, “The very first book of the Bible, for 
example, describes how failure to obey the ultimate authority resulted in the loss of 
paradise for Adam, Eve, and the rest of the human race.”195 Obedience is highly valued 
in many cultures. Third, liking is a rule of influence which states that people prefer to 
comply with others they know and like, especially but not exclusively friends.196  
Fourth, the scarcity principle shows that “people assign more value to 
opportunities when they are less available.”197 Cialdini explains that one reason scarcity 
works so well is that people hate to lose freedoms as opportunities decrease. When it 
comes to ideology messaging, this means people come to believe more in information 
that is denied to them. This suggests an opportunity for social movements to simply 
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inform people that they are trying to get information to them, but their repressive 
government is blocking that information.  
Cialdini’s fifth technique is social proof: “one important means that people use to 
decide what to believe or how to act in a situation is to look at what other people are 
believing or doing there.”198 A behavior seems acceptable if others are doing it. Social 
proof led to the death of the 910 People’s Temple followers who intentionally poisoned 
themselves in an isolated jungle at Jonestown, Guyana, South America. In cases such as 
these, influential leaders of movements arrange social conditions to allow this principle to 
work.  
Finally, the commitment principle states, “people are more willing to agree to 
requests that are in keeping with [a] prior commitment.”199 Commitments can start small 
but then build into compliance. Commitment sets the stage for future consistency. The 
consistency principle is the desire to appear consistent in word, attitude, and action.200 
The ideological messages a social movement sends through the communication pathway 
will attempt to leverage at least one of these six influence techniques, in the positive or its 
opposite, to gain compliance or participation of intended audiences. 
5. Message Form 
The final step along the communication pathway depicted in Figure 13 involves 
the selected form of the message that impacts the ideology receiver’s senses. Messages 
can take the form of verbal speech (including rumors), pictures, gestures, texts, bullets, 
walls, etc. So, messages can be received by all the senses. In information operations, 
these are all called symbols. In speech, the primary message is in the sound waves, while 
other messages are sensed in relation to past messages as the receiver filters ideas through 
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his or her experiences.201 The forms are the packaged ideas that impact interpretation 
agents—the things, sometimes visible, that are sensed and perceived by audiences.  
6. An Example 
Operationalization of an ideology is as simple as a father pointing to a Civil War 
poster to gain the attention of his daughter and saying: You see, that is why this nation is 
so great. This statement has white attribution, since the father is owning its origin. The 
poster itself is also operationalizing ideology; it may be labeled by a publisher (white), 
unlabeled (gray), or incorrectly labeled (black). In this instance, the father is conveying a 
white idea, because he intends to be completely honest about the effects of the violent 
struggle and how the nation is somehow better for it. He is not attempting to withhold 
important truths from his daughter or create a lie. The channel is face to face, since the 
father and daughter are speaking. The poster is another channel in and of itself, and it 
may have influenced the girl even if the father did not draw attention to it or speak about 
it, but since he did, one can expect that the combination of the father and the poster is 
now taking a significant amount of the daughter’s attention. The predominant influence 
mechanism is authority—if Dad says this is true, then it must be true. Finally, the 
message forms are visual gesture and verbal, since the father pointed and spoke about his 
sociopolitical worldview. Depending on what the poster’s creator intended about the 
goodness of the Civil War, the father may be attempting to rebuild the thin ideology of 
nationalism. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Resonance operations are already at work in the world. The findings in this thesis 
create a view of the real sociopolitical world in light of viable competing ideologies that 
transmit from social movements to intended audiences through communication pathways. 
With information saturation in the modern world, it is up to interpretation agents to 
determine what is retained in their ideologies and what is eliminated. However, deception 
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and influence techniques can be used in conjunction with ideology resonance to gain 
support or action for the social movement.  
To resonate with an intended audience, social movements can send offensive or 
defensive ideological messages through the communication pathway. The entire process 
can occur within seconds or take years to convince someone to join the cause. However, 
viable ideas that are absorbed by a receiver are constrained by the four environmental 
factors.  
Neither truth nor pure logic is essential for ideologies to spread. However, the 
competition of ideologies does involve ethics. Since ideologies deal with thoughts and 
behaviors, they produce a tough battle between right, wrong, and how people actually 
think and act. The goal of an ideology is maximum acceptance by people and control 
over political language. Cialdini’s six influence tactics show how ideological ideas can be 
leveraged in the negative, since the influence tactics can all be employed for good or evil. 
Ideology resonance has to do with selecting viable ideological messages within the 
environmental constraints, selecting a believable input critique, beating pre-existing and 
unintended ideology messages, and selecting five suitable choices along the 
communication pathway to reach and influence the intended audience.  
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V. THE IDEOLOGY OPERATIONALIZING SEQUENCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the second half of this thesis’s main argument: developing 
social movements operationalize ideologies by executing external and internal 
considerations which leverage the ideology communication pathway. The chapter begins 
by covering the external and internal operationalizing factors for the social movement 
organization. It then discusses narratives, frames, and memes in order to illustrate the 
actual techniques employed in information warfare—information warfare’s munitions. 
Operationalizing ideology may have seemed abstract until this chapter, but in this chapter 
I intend to demonstrate how these ideas go to war. 
A social movement organization has countless decisions to make in order to 
compete for influence and control in society. In this chapter, I identify 11 external and 
two internal considerations that a social movement can plan for and execute to optimize 
its resonance operations’ successes. Narratives, frames, and memes are specific tools that 
a social movement or a special operations force can send through a communication 
pathway to compete for ideology influence. The operationalizing steps can happen 
simultaneously and are dependent on resonating ideologies, intended audiences, and 
effective ideology communication pathway factors. Based on the observation of 
problems, solutions, and strategies, social movement organizations choose resonating 
ideas, the ideology pathway, and the intended audience, while adjusting to strengthen the 
credibility of the messages and organization to ultimately transform adherents into action 
agents before the political ideas are lost, distorted, or blocked.  
B. OPERATIONALIZING FACTORS 
The ways ideologies compete through the communication pathway to intended 
audiences only illuminate the environment necessary for ideas to be operationalized. The 
solution to the research question itself—how can developing social movements 
operationalize ideology?—demands further investigation into the operationalizing steps 
necessary to achieve social movement outputs. 
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If the ideology pathway is valid, another conditional process is required to show 
how social movements operationalize political ideas. The perpetual opportunity to 
explain how the world is structured suggests the nature of ideology competition. With 
differences throughout the world in culture, environmental conditions, available 
resources, and spiritual beliefs, politics remains a constant fixture for social power. 
Operationalizing ideologies has to do with improving life. 
Social movements operationalize ideologies using a backwards planning model, in 
which they begin by first determining what the objectives are and the expected effects, then 
planning the necessary actions to achieve those goals in reverse order. This is how to 
resonate ideology with an intended audience—know what makes people tick before 
attempting to send resonant messages. There are external and internal activities that occur 
simultaneously. Many concepts and actions are generated within social movements and 
then moved out into the environment, but movements also have internal considerations, in 
which they look inward and make adjustments to their own organizations. Table 2 
summarizes the 11 external steps, as well as the two internal considerations, for 
successfully operationalizing an ideology. Each of these are discussed following the table.  
Table 2.   How Developing Social Movements Can Operationalize Ideologies 
Operationalization to maximize effectiveness 
The social movement organization’s external considerations: 
1) Determine strategic objectives 
2) Diagnose and illuminate problems with the existing ideology  
3) Identify external conditions that affect intended audiences’ (IA) passions  
4) Determine IA inspirations and motivations 
5) Determine IA susceptibility to new ideas and accessibility via channels 
6) Determine IA probability to participate  
7) Select resonating ideas and the pathway to the IA  
1) Decide on a particular message channel and form 
2) Decide on attribution of the sender and whether to deceive 
3) Decide on influence mechanisms  
8) Build credibility of social movements and/or erode credibility of competitors 
9) Build survivability around messages  
10) Gain feedback by monitoring and evaluating output indicators  
11) Constantly tune ideology resonance  
Internal considerations: 
1) Synchronize new political ideas and solutions 
2) Constantly self-tune 
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While grievances can be unique to the social movement, the organization will still 
want to survey the local population to determine how naturally resonant its concerns are 
with those of others. The methodology of Military Information Support Operations 
(formerly called Psychological Operations) within U.S. Army Special Operations Forces 
reveals a template for how to influence ideas drifting through the communication 
spectrum. Important to this section is that the actions and points of view are those of the 
social movement, while ideology is what is operationalized. 
1. External Considerations 
Before attempting to influence behavior with ideas, social movements must first 
determine its strategic objectives and the tactical objectives of each audience. Potential 
success is maximized when they begin by identifying strategic wants or needs and then 
plan activities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels with those goals in mind.202 
If there is no strategic objective for a specific audience, operationalizing ideology 
directed at that audience becomes a questionable or even risky endeavor to the 
movement’s other goals—and, of course, influencing behavior of any sort can lead to 
unintended consequences.  
As for diagnosing the problems in the existing ideology, Step Two, it is important 
to understand and illuminate places where the ideology is insufficient, the local grievances, 
and those who are to blame for the problems. Through multiple intelligence and 
information sources, social movements must conduct intended audience (IA) analysis.203  
The next four steps can happen rapidly and often simultaneously. In Step Three, 
social movements can benefit by identifying conditions that affect IA passions, such as 
lifestyle, competing ideologies, and the advice, trust, and communication networks. 
According to the MISO field manual, the task is to determine why people are behaving 
                                                 
202 Department of the Army, Psychological Operations Process: Tactics, Techniques, and Principles 
(FM 3–05.301) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Headquarters, 2007), 1–26–1-27. The name of 
this organization changed to Military Information Support Operations. The names are exchangeable in this 
text. FM stands for Field Manual. 
203 Ibid., 2–1. 
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the way they do, working from the assumption that all behavior serves some purpose.204 
The manual assumes that behaviors are a result of cost-benefit analysis, and if this 
process is observed and understood, the chances of determining an effective influence 
mechanism increase. Externally, social movements assess the audience’s environment 
and social situation. Internal to the audience, their attitudes, values, and beliefs are 
researched to help gauge why they respond the way they do. Both external and internal to 
the audience, critical analysis can focus on how factors such as politics, military, 
economics, society, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and history 
influence behavior. 
There are several relevant networks in which audiences are connected. In order to 
develop a powerful image of how individuals or organizations relate to others, examining 
the advice, trust, and communication networks can illuminate connections and 
vulnerabilities that would otherwise go unnoticed or be taken for granted. David 
Krackhardt and Jeffrey Hanson explain, “The advice network shows the prominent 
players in an organization on whom others depend to solve problems and provide 
technical information.”205 They explain that these networks reveal those behind political 
conflict and the most influential members of a group, while “The trust network tells 
which [members] share delicate political information and back one another in a crisis.”206 
Finally, communication networks show those who discuss the movement’s issues. They 
“can help identify gaps in information flow, the inefficient use of resources, and the 
failure to generate new ideas.”207  
Illuminating these networks provides information on issues such as whether the 
formal structure of an organization is different than the informal one, whether or not 
people go to certain leaders for help, or where communication bottlenecks. Having this 
information leads to better-informed solutions. A significant challenge with this type of 
                                                 
204 Department of the Army, Psychological Operations Process, 2–9, 2–12. 
205 David Krackhardt and Jeffrey R. Hanson, “Informal Networks: The Company,” Harvard Business 
Review (July—August 1993): 105. 
206 Ibid., 105. 
207 Ibid., 106. 
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work is that gathering the data depends on engaging people and surveying them face to 
face or electronically.  
In Step Four, social movements determine IA inspirations, such as an effective 
motivational frame, the audience’s needs, attitudes, pride, and other arousal triggers and 
causes. They also seek to determine audience wants, desires, achievements, and shared 
visions, as well as understand the motivations and psychological factors of each intended 
audience such as safety and sustenance.208 If those needs are met for the audience in 
question, according to the field manual, secondary and learned social motivations will 
instead drive its action, such as power, status, achievement, revenge, money, and 
education. Not being able to satisfy motivations leads to frustration, which can be 
exploited by movements and counter-movements. Some additional psychological factors 
include attitudes, fears, opinions, norms, loves, and hates. All of these motives and 
factors can be viewed as vulnerabilities for an audience. 
Next (Step Five), it is critical for movements to determine the IA’s susceptibility 
to new ideas and accessibility via channels. Social movements can determine how likely 
an audience is to buy into a persuasion scheme. Non-susceptibility to certain influences 
and ideas can totally rearrange the prioritization of audiences and strategies. Using a scale 
of high to low susceptibility, following analysis and rating, social movements can 
become more aware of which channels and which messages are most likely to succeed 
and fail.209 They must determine consistency with the audience conditions and 
inspirations they identified earlier. They must also understand how the intended 
audiences evaluate the risks and rewards of the behavior the social movements desire 
from them. The greater the audience perceives the rewards and the lower the risks, the 
greater the likelihood of the behavior.210  
One way to determine susceptibility is to look at how past or contemporary ideas 
diffuse in the society. Social movements can determine how the audience receives 
                                                 
208 Department of the Army, Psychological Operations Process, 2–17–2-18. 
209 Ibid., 2–20. 
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information regularly. According to the field manual, this includes an audience’s 
accessibility to information and how frequently they reach sources, their patterns of 
discovery, and the degrees of active and passive learning. Understanding susceptibility, in 
other words, involves determining audience access to channels and the potential risks 
people take when using them. This means that social movements attempt to understand 
the type of radio signals the audience listens to, the typical length of newspaper columns 
it reads, and even what colors the audience responds to.211 The field manual considers the 
communication pattern to be more valuable if more people use the channel more often; 
movements should also know whether given channels are used merely for entertainment 
or for serious political information. It is expected to be easier to gain and maintain an 
audience’s attention if she is actively looking for information. Radio or television may be 
background noise while audiences are doing other tasks, making it harder to get their 
attention and ensure they absorb messages. It is also important to know if intended 
individuals digest their information in groups, which can lead to discussion and debate 
about ideology. Social movements may consider introducing new channels; in that case, 
they must evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of unfamiliar channels versus old 
ones.212 However well a new channel may be received, movements must gauge how hard 
it will be to ensure the messages are the focus and not the channel itself.  
Step Six, determining the IA’s probability of participation, demands qualitative 
analysis and forecasting. It is a matter of observing current audience behavior and 
deciding whether those natural functions will fit the movement’s strategic actions or 
desired functions.213 
The seventh step is necessary for operationalizing ideology. It includes the 
selection of explanatory resonating ideas (using narratives, frames, and memes) as well as 
the pathway to selected audiences. These themes will be primarily delivered by appeals, 
arguments, and evidence in order to achieve the desired behavior response, according to 
the manual. These three elements—idea, pathway, and intended audience—are essential 
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to the operationalizing process. To be clear, ideologies may take a different pathway and 
tempo than intended; they can also impact unintended audiences, but then a given social 
movement is no longer in control of the ideology’s operative power. If social movements 
do not determine ideas, the pathway, and the intended audience, they are not conducting 
resonance operations.  
Movements must then choose a channel and form for their message. Narratives, 
frames, and memes are ways messages can be organized and packaged to be sent through 
the communication field; I cover this in greater detail in the next section. Social 
movements use information from the assessments and analysis to align a susceptible 
audience to an effective pathway. There are many combinations available to a social 
movement for consideration. 
Aside from consciousness and influence, which I have already discussed, there are 
numerous other ways to influence audiences. According to the MISO field manual, an 
argument is the guiding framework to persuade the IA to act in accordance with a social 
movement’s goals.214 It is the summary an audience member reaches that compels 
participation. According to the manual, an appeal is the way in which the argument is 
presented to gain and maintain attention. Common appeals include legitimacy (e.g., 
authority, reverence, tradition, or loyalty), fear, dividing groups, companionship, the 
conformity bandwagon, nostalgia, and individual self-interest. The manual also lists several 
persuasion techniques: emotional generalities, transferring qualities to others, lesser of 
evils, name calling, the ordinary citizen image, reputation testimonials, insinuation, simply 
right vs. wrong or good vs. bad, comparing and contrasting, illustrations, specifics, 
statistics, and explanations. All of these techniques can be leveraged in conjunction with an 
ideological message. In addition to Cialdini’s influence tactics, the manual lists several 
others: punishments and rewards, expertise, calling in on debts owed, appeal to morals, and 
promising positive or negative feelings. 
In Step Eight, social movements build their own credibility and/or erode the 
credibility of their competitors. Their perceived credibility depends on how consistent 
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their message is with the expressed social solutions and segments of society identified as 
intended audiences. Other ways to determine credibility include trustworthiness, fallacies, 
contradictions, and hypocrisies.  
Movements that represent modification of a pre-existing ideology are expected to 
reflect a different organizational or societal structure than that of the pre-existing society. 
In fact, while social movements compete for physical survival, their organization may 
look very different from how they want society structured, which can lead to problems of 
credibility. The greater the difference between a social movement’s organizational design 
and the future good societal design it seeks, the weaker its perceived credibility is 
expected to be. Credibility matters, and matching organization-behavioral designs 
improves credibility for social movements, though depending on the image of the good 
society, this may not be viable for a small movement. It is beyond the scope of this 
project to illustrate how a social movement can organize itself to project a credible face. 
To remain optimal, in Step Nine, social movements can build survivability around 
messages by tests, coordination, and dissemination according to sequencing. They can 
also prolong the life of their ideas through optimal timing, duration, repetition, 
placement, and quantity. Pre-testing an idea involves taking a small sample of the 
intended audience, surveying them, and evaluating whether they understand and accept 
the explanations.215 Once exposed to the message, the sample group can be asked what a 
message means or what actions it implies. If there are unintended discrepancies at this 
point, movements can change the messages before employing major influencing 
mechanisms and perhaps mass media channels.216 Prepared messages will be distributed 
to their launch points, except where computers render this unnecessary. After 
distribution, dissemination of messages takes the local situation into consideration before 
launch. This is not just the political situation or the channel infrastructure, but also the 
credibility of the dissemination platform itself, as with certain broadcasting agencies.217 
If the circumstance permits, post-testing can be done to see if the messages are reaching 
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the intended audiences, whether or not they are resonating, and if the desired action is 
occurring.218  
In Step 10, social movements can gain feedback by monitoring and evaluating 
output indicators such as observable numbers of recruited constituents, adherents of 
seldom activity, busy activists, and willingly violent adherents.219 Additionally, 
movements can determine who is a good ideology repeater agent, something which can 
be surveyed during post-testing by determining where the ideas have diffused outside of 
the social movement organization’s direct influence. Finally, movements must 
continually determine the audience’s risk-reward or cost-benefit calculus for joining the 
social movement and transmitting messages. 
With feedback, in Step 11, social movements are in a position to fine tune 
their ideology resonance. Blocks of messages can be cancelled if it appears the 
intended audience is not resonating with the explanation.220 Messages that seem to 
gain more traction leading to transmission of ideas or growth in the movement can be 
moved to a higher priority for broader dissemination.  
2. Internal Considerations
With prognosis, social movements synchronize new political ideas and solutions 
between their organization and intended audiences. The two will never be totally aligned, 
however. As soon as movements begin to form a consistent explanation and rationale of 
their ideology, they begin to lose touch with the ever-evolving culture and therefore with 
some people. Social movements then have options: resolve grievance generalities 
emerging from the people; rebuild some past notion of the good society; attempt to 
disseminate a new, modified interpretation; explain more problems existing in society to 
discredit the competition; or create a completely distinct ideological solution. This step 
218 Department of the Army, Psychological Operations Process, 6–7, 6–10–6-18. 
219 Ibid., 7–2. This is a change from the impact indicators sought by Military Information Support 
Operations forces, but still recognizes the desired behavior of joining the movement. 
220 Ibid., 3–8. 
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can happen simultaneously with the external considerations, but unlike those factors, 
these solutions are responses to perceived problems.  
Social movements, at least successful ones, will constantly self-tune. This does 
not mean they will always conform to their audience; sometimes the self-tuning will 
highlight potential divergences from the audience. Formally, the organization considers 
decision rights such as governance forums; motivators such as rewards, careers, and 
talent processes; information flow and knowledge management; and responsibility 
structure to manage movement tasks like resourcing, security, and messaging.221 
Informally, the organization considers norms like typical values, expectations, and 
behaviors; commitments like shared visions, individual goals, or pride; mindset of 
identity, beliefs, assumptions, and biases; and networks of communication and influence, 
as explained by Gary Neilson et al. The purpose of the organization dictates any 
organizational redesign, which means the social movement organization takes a shape 
different from its competitors.222 The design of the organization will assist or hinder its 
ability to operationalize ideologies as audiences evaluate the movement’s consistency 
with the projected good society.  
C. FRAMES, NARRATIVES, AND MEMES FOR SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
IDEOLOGY RESONANCE 
Social movements construct meaning and tell stories to support themselves. By 
packaging these messages through framing, narratives, and memes, they can send their 
stories through chosen channels to their audience in ways that will affect them on a 
deeply personal level. 
1. Framing Processes 
Framing processes are the mechanisms by which social movements send resonant 
messages. Social movements actively frame events and conditions in order to produce 
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meanings and ideas.223 Framing assigns meaning to events with the goal of mobilizing 
the in-group, gaining the neutrals’ support, and demobilizing the out-group. 
Frame alignment is “the linkage of individual and [social movement organization] 
SMO interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and 
beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary.”224 
David Snow and his colleagues claim that many analysts overlook how individuals within 
a social movement interpret their group grievances. Framing is about resonating with the 
interpretation of problems. People will only participate in a social movement if they align 
well with at least one of its frames.225 Snow et al. also note that frame alignment is 
constantly reassessed by audiences.226 To them, a factor that determines whether or not a 
frame is working is the resonance of its content with the expectations of potential 
recruits. In that case, the framing effort is expected to be more successful with greater 
resonance.  
In an early paper on framing, Snow and his colleagues identified four methods to 
mobilize individuals: “frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame 
transformation.”227 These and their extensions are presented in Table 3 and discussed 
subsequently.228  
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Table 3.   Frame Alignment Processes229 
Frame Alignment Explanation 
Frame bridging “the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but 
structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or 
problem” or “the linkage of an SMO with… unmobilized 
sentiment pools or public opinion preference clusters” 
Frame amplification “the clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that 
bears on a particular issue, problem, or set of events” 
v1 Value amplification “the identification, idealization, and elevation of one or more 
values presumed basic to prospective constituents but which 
have not inspired collective action” 
v2 Belief amplification presumes a relationship with things or a thing and its feature, 
such as “God is beautiful” 
v1 Grievance “a cause of distress (as an unsatisfactory working condition) felt 
to afford reason for complaint or resistance” 
v2 Causality and blame “the relation between a cause and its effects” and “to find fault 
with… to place responsibility for” 
v3 Antagonists adversary targets of influence are symbolized as evil and become 
the focus of negative attention  
v4 Efficacy “change is possible but that it will not happen automatically, 
without collective action” 
v5 Standing up generates “a sense of necessity” or moral obligation to be 
counted instead of not being involved 
Frame extension “extend[s] the boundaries of its primary framework so as to 
encompass interests or points of view that are incidental to its 
primary objectives but of considerable salience to potential 
adherents” 
Frame transformation the dropping of old meanings and understandings, the planting 
of new values, and reframing the misframed to gain support and 
participants 
v1 Specific domain “fairly self-contained but substantial changes in the way a 
particular domain of life is framed, such that a domain 
previously taken for granted is reframed as problematic and in 
need of repair, or a domain seen as normative or acceptable is 
reframed as an injustice that warrants change” 
v2 Global domain when one’s foundation is changed by displacing previous 
worldly discourse with new grammar and rules 
Interpretive frame “cognitively align[s] structural/material conditions with latent 
mobilizing strands of ‘folk’ (inherent or organic) ideologies or 
transform[s] the meaning or significance of those conditions for 
the aggregations effected by them” 
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Frame bridging and amplification mechanisms link personal interests and existing 
adherent sentiment to movement support. To understand frame bridging, think of 
sentiment pools (or groups of people that share similar opinions and attitudes about a 
situation) that share grievances but lack the organization to express their discontent and 
act to achieve their interests.230 Social movements, however, bridge their grievances with 
another sentiment pool. According to Snow and his colleagues, social movements usually 
lean on frame bridging more than all other alignment mechanisms for mobilization and 
diffusion of ideas. However, using something like a cell phone list assumes most people 
share ideological views. Generalizing grievances in this way turns subjective 
participation and orientation into a constant, mechanistic outreach process, which runs 
the risk of market oversaturation and running a wide variety of impersonal appeals.231 
The framing conventions in Table 3 offer social movements ways to package ideological 
messages as they attempt to convince their intended audiences of their validity. 
There are two types of frame amplification—value and belief amplifications. 
Snow and others explain that values are protectable and promotable modes of conduct.232 
Value amplification becomes an available framing mechanism when values are 
suppressed or lack expression opportunities. The goal of this amplification is to mobilize 
sentiment groups. According to Snow et al., value-based examples that movements 
typically amplify include “family, ethnicity, property, and neighborhood integrity… 
justice, cooperation, perseverance, and the sanctity of human life… [and] equality and 
liberty.”233 In the context of a repressive authority, movements can recruit and mobilize 
potential constituents by elevating relevant values. According to Snow and others, it is a 
reactive frame used by dominated groups. As movements choose different frames to 
increase recruitment numbers for the cause, they attempt to never contradict a value 
frame. 
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Beliefs support or disrupt action that pursues desired values.234 Action depends 
on belief about something, but the link between beliefs and action is never totally clear or 
unclear, and sometimes belief and action are contradictory.235 As an example Snow et al. 
illustrate how antagonist belief amplification can leverage threatening beliefs about 
transients to make homeless people look bad. They explain that efficacy leverages 
optimism that collective action, even at the grassroots level, will improve the probability 
of change. At the same time, this frame is pessimistic about others being able to 
accomplish certain objectives. Finally, a call to stand up to be counted in the movement 
leverages the belief that nobody else will do it. Belief amplification can cause movement 
activity. 
Next is frame extension, which is evident when certain programs seem outside the 
“existing sentiment or adherent pools.”236 The enlarging of the pool involves the 
movement grafting and aligning nearby interests and values with those who are already 
in. Frame extension is not a primary long-term strategy to keep members participating in 
the movement, but a hook for initial attendance. Snow and colleagues explain that this 
can encompass auxiliary interests such as bringing in popular bands at rallies. Recruiters 
may not try to sell the movement at all but simply try to persuade people to attend one 
meeting. Frame extension can use music or sex as the initial step to eventual movement 
activity. A risk with this mechanism is losing adherent support, because some may only 
be persuaded by long-term frames.  
Frame transformation is an even more time- and energy-consuming mechanism, 
because “The programs, causes, and values that some SMOs promote… may not resonate 
with, and on occasion may even appear antithetical to, conventional lifestyles or rituals 
and extant interpretive frames.”237 The two variants of this mechanism (specific domain 
and global domain, as listed in Table 3) involve reframing time. Additionally, these 
frames redefine activities that hold meaning. The situation does not change, but its 
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definition does, resulting in a different experience—a situation may be tolerable at first, 
only for it later to be recognized as inexcusable. The transformation frame is about 
developing and adopting a sense of injustice but must correspond with an attributional 
orientation shift, such as blaming.238 This frame seeks societal change and may be 
leveraged heavily at the beginning of a movement. To reiterate, ideological messages can 
be packaged with these different framing conventions for recruiting members into the 
social movement.  
Domain-specific interpretive frames are about perceptually bracketing certain 
aspects of life, as often seen in “single-issue movements.”239 These types of frames may 
be necessary for movements seeking dramatic identity change. They may only achieve a 
nominal increase in movement participation because they focus on limited groups, such 
as children, women, those with disabilities, prisoners, ethnicities, and races.240 They are 
at work in causes like redefining how negative a drunk driver is. There is a risk here if the 
movement is not prepared to adapt to sudden recruitment successes. By contrast, the 
global interpretive frame is a broader master frame about conversion to a new paradigm 
or experiencing the world “in a new key.”241 Snow et al. explain this type of 
transformation is when everything, at least slightly, has new meaning. Recruited 
adherents will feel like new people and see the world completely differently. Global 
transformation reduces uncertainty about life.  
A few years after Snow and his colleagues formulated their theory, Snow and 
Robert Benford added the interpretive frame, which stresses that movements emerging 
late in the cycle of protest are constrained by the earlier, and now master, frame.242 They 
propose that mobilization failure in the context of ripe structural conditions might be due 
to a lack of resonant frames. Table 4 is a continuation of Table 3, focused on three 
ideology-based framing tasks.  
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Table 4.   Framing Tasks243 
Framing Tasks Explanation 
Diagnostic frame “identification of a problem and the attribution of 
blame or causality” 
Prognostic frame “solutions to the problem but also to identify 
strategies, tactics, and targets” 
Motivational frame “elaboration of a call to arms or rationale for action 
that goes beyond the diagnosis and prognosis” 
 
Snow and Benford also discuss three main framing tasks: diagnostic, prognostic, 
and motivational. They claim that “The more the three tasks are robust or richly 
developed and interconnected, the more successful the mobilization effort.”244 They had 
the problem-solution-strategy definition of ideology specifically in mind when they 
added these frames.  
These three frames offer additional encoding options for a social movement’s 
messages. Diagnostic framing is not just about problem identification. To Snow and 
Benford, this frame determines and prioritizes problematic causal factors and attributions 
for the social movement.245 However, different wings of a movement might prioritize 
different causes. The prognostic frame often corresponds directly with the diagnostic 
frame, but this is not required. One risk of the prognostic framing convention is that it 
focuses on solutions, and despite the definition in the table, it does not always offer clear 
strategies. Snow and Benford warn, “The unintended consequence is that guidelines for 
action are unclear.”246 A risk to both diagnosis and prognosis framing is using elitist 
jargon as opposed to clearly demanding grassroots participation. Snow and Benford 
thought about (with the prognosis frame) but did not offer a specific frame for the social 
movement’s strategy.  
                                                 
243 Adapted from Snow and Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” 
200, 201, 202. Pages listed in reference order. Italic in original. 
244 Ibid., 199. 
245 Ibid., 200. 
246 Ibid., 203. 
 85
Snow and Benford highlight a critical point: framing and even gaining consensus 
on problems and solutions do not necessarily mobilize people.247 They claim 
participation demands some sort of force for action, as described by the last frame in 
Table 4. Snow and Benford explain the motivational frame is all about trying to convince 
specific audiences of the need and utility of going active. From the resource mobilization 
perspective, this can include status, material, and moral incentives. However, there are 
risks with this frame—it can neutralize other operating frames and can paint a doomsday 
image in which people feel no use in participating at all. In short, then:  
mobilization depends not only on the existence of objective structural 
disparities and dislocations, the availability and deployment of tangible 
resources, leaders’ organizational skills, political opportunities, and a kind 
of cost-benefit calculus engaged in by prospective participants but also on 
the way these variables are framed and the degree to which they resonate 
with the targets of mobilization.248  
Snow and Benford discuss several anchoring factors for ideologies—not external 
environmental constraints but internal anchors to the ideas themselves. They argue that 
ideologies (which they call belief systems) hold central values for the movement and are 
highly salient in successful mobilization.249 As far as what is relevant to intended 
audiences, narrative constraints include empirical credibility (or fit between frame and 
worldly events); experiential commensurability (or the credibility of frames based on 
experience-based interpretation, considered the most important element for mobilization 
potency); and narrative fidelity (or the degree that frames resonate with a culture’s 
narrative).250 These constraints mean that framing is not the only reason people resonate 
with ideas. 
2. Narratives 
Although narratives can be combined with frames, narratives offer a different way 
to create resonance with intended audiences. Snow and Benford define narratives as 
                                                 
247 Snow and Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” 202–204. 
248 Ibid., 213. 
249 Ibid., 205–206. 
250 Ibid., 208–210. 
 86
“stories, myths, and folk tales that are part and parcel of one’s cultural heritage and that 
thus function to inform events and experiences in the immediate present.”251 Joseph 
Davis, who argues the importance of narrative to carry messages, criticizes the frame-
alignment process for overemphasizing cognitive factors, logical persuasion, and 
consensus of belief and underemphasizing the broader narrative. He argues that framing 
deals with arousing moral responses and focuses on emotions for mobilizing action, 
mostly looking at logical beliefs and personal efficacy. While he admits framing attempts 
to resonate with pre-existing meanings, he argues that it tends “not to systematically 
explore the pre-existing meanings.”252 On the contrary, narratives, he believes, add value 
to resonance operations. 
Davis claims narratives are different from purely descriptive communication—
they are “a social act and form of explanation.”253 He argues that unlike philosophic truth 
or deductive arguments, which are testable and debatable, narratives invite imagination 
and emotion designed to control an audience’s responses and inferences. A verbal or 
written narrative is the primary form that creates meaning for human experience. 
Narratives influence time and place in that authors seek ways to connect people in history 
and the world. These stories communicate perspective on what happened.  
The purpose of stories is to moralize events, and narrative is about leveraging 
events and individuals by highlighting features such as morals, emotions, movement 
culture, and identity. Davis considers the way there are different participation rules in 
court depending on whether the audience is a judge or a jury and how the accused has 
certain cultural rules to meet, such as expressing a need for self-help treatment in drug 
court.  
Since narratives are a significant way to organize resonant ideological messages, I 
provide some additional information here. Narratives are more effective when an author 
understands her intended audience. They create meaning by organizing events and 
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actions and attributing significance to them—giving them a plot.254 Davis explains that 
plot takes an unconnected succession of events and brings them into a configuration with 
cause and effect. He argues that stories explain events retrospectively, since meaning 
depends on the results of the causal chain, and they generate that explanation through the 
order of the story. In other words, stories reshape the past with meaning and project a 
future.255  
The power of a narrative is in the way it configures an experience by event 
selection and the timing of plot for significance. A second power source in stories is in 
the social relationship between narrator and audience—stories take on life in the minds of 
receivers:  
By engaging the audience’s narrativity, storytellers draw the audience into 
the story because the connections being made are the product of the 
reader/listener’s mind and not simply a perception of what is written or 
heard. As a result, he or she can feel involved in events and care about 
characters even when they are, in fact, very far from his or her own 
experience (a point of obvious importance to social movements).256  
The storyteller attempts to create a certain audience experience, and she 
stimulates recognition and empathy to create shared identity and sometimes a sense of 
purpose. Still, any given story can affect numerous audiences differently. This virtual 
dimension is the combination of imagination and text. With nonfiction narratives, the 
audience seeks a story that coheres with reality. 
Individuals impose narratives on their own lives for self-understanding and self-
representation. Identity hinges on one’s evolving story, which emerges through the plot 
development of experiences. Self-narrative describes one’s morals, purpose, and 
intentions. As a person’s understanding of the good society is about orientation to moral 
space—the good, the worthwhile, or the meaningful—this self-narrative has a strong 
impact on which ideology a person will resonate with; as Davis says, “identity cannot be 
                                                 
254 Davis, “Narrative and Social Movements,” 11. 
255 Ibid., 12, 14. 
256 Ibid., 16. 
 88
detached from the individual’s beliefs about what things have significance, from his or 
her fundamental evaluations with regard to questions of the good in life.”257  
One’s own narrative is anchored by the influence of pre-existing, public narratives 
like myths and family stories.258 “Culturally and institutionally embedded narratives with 
which we identify, then, shape the construction of our self-story. And interpersonal 
networks, moral communities, and public institutions, including, importantly, social 
movements, both sanction and supply such narratives.”259 Participant narratives can have 
passing significance or become the basis of a biographical conversion, which can occur 
when a movement member goes active.260 If resonant, narratives actively shape meaning 
for intended audiences.  
3. Memes 
The final way to package ideological messages is through memes, which “are 
ideas, skills, habits, stories or any kind of information that is copied from person to 
person.”261 Blackmore explains that they include images of influential people, treaties, 
rules, eating habits, songs, fashions, dances, flags, and technologies. Almost like genes 
copying information in DNA, memes copy social interaction, though their fidelity is 
lower than DNA’s.262 Blackmore argues that like genes, memes carry evolutionary 
principles: they copy information, allowing for variation, and then there is a selection 
process. For example, books and jokes offer slight variations then compete to be retold. 
According to Blackmore, “Memes are copied by imitation, teaching and reading, and by 
photocopying.”263 Variation occurs with imperfect copying, such as forgetting certain 
details, misremembering, and combining new memes. Blackmore describes humans as 
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meme machines that copy, store, and recombine information.264 The only interest of a 
meme is self-replication. Some memes discriminately succeed if deemed useful, such as 
in technology, institutions, arts, and sciences.  
Maajid Nawaz claims that in addition to narrative, the idea of a nation depends on 
leaders, alliances, and symbols—in other words, memes. Indirectly, Nawaz discusses the 
way memes sustain a collective and support its goals. He claims nations only progress 
when there is consensus on their fundamental direction.265 Without consensus, the only 
thing people do is respond to problems randomly. Aside from frames and narratives, 
memes are essential to move a holistic idea forward. Nawaz argues that leaders set 
direction and strategy for the ideas. Alliances such as diverse youth groups are required 
for an idea to take off. Symbols such as flags, architecture, and art give the idea a brand.  
To illustrate how memes support a movement, Nawaz synchronizes leaders, 
alliances, symbols, and narratives. His example includes the leader Osama bin Laden, the 
global network of alliances in support of him, and an image of a Western Christian 
crusader. He explains al-Qaeda’s narrative as “The sanctuaries, the assets and the wealth 
of the (Islamic) nation have been violated and spoiled by the heinous infidels and their 
agents in the apostate governments.”266 Images of group leaders and flags are other ideas 
that can be transmitted through the communication pathway in support of a social 
movement and its ideology.  
D. HOW IDEAS GO TO WAR 
Ideas go visible, in ideological terms, when the ideological strategy demands 
action, and possibly violence, to achieve the good society. Violence appears to be a 
matter of degree in every major ideology strategy, varying according to how important 
people believe it will be to achieving the intended solutions. In this section, I shift from 
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discussing the perception of ideological debate into the ideological warfare that results 
from it.  
Social movements can grow to lead countries, as seen with Hitler and Mandela. 
Until this point, this thesis has discussed ideology competition as a more or less non-
violent phenomenon, perhaps like a marketing contest for political ideas. However, all 
major ideology strategies throughout human history have eventually included violence. 
Even the predominately pacifist movement led by Mahatma Gandhi, who urged 
arbitration before strikes, boiled over into violent outbreaks.267 There is nothing new or 
old about this finding—violence is part of human nature.  
William Andrews, a retired Special Forces officer, provides us with the backdrop 
for this discussion on going visible. His remarks in The Village War: Vietnamese 
Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province 1960–1964 succinctly 
describe how the communist North Vietnamese fought the war, one village and one mind 
at a time:  
Party documents and testimony of Party members indicate that these 
killings were carefully planned and were influenced by prevailing local 
conditions…. assassination was a political instrument wielded only by the 
Party and, like all instruments, completely subordinate to Party political 
policies…  
[T]he “liberated” zones had largely been “cleansed” of Government 
presence and the people in them had been properly indoctrinated, 
executions were minimal, and “re-education” was the first resort for 
elimination of wrong tendencies...  
The Destruction of the Oppression was complemented by the Reduction of 
Prestige, a “special form of repression usually… reserved for local 
government officials whom the Viet Cong wish to debase before their 
fellow villagers.” A village leader marked for Reduction of Prestige was 
often kidnapped, isolated, and “re-educated” in a secret location. Usually, 
the “re-education” succeeded in intimidating the victim to the extent that 
he was ready to admit to specified crimes in order to escape with life and 
limb intact, whereupon he was brought before the assembled villagers, his 
crimes against the people were enumerated, and he was forced to recant… 
                                                 
267 Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the 
Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), 377, 379.  
 91
A former Government official in the district of Cai Be described his 
kidnapping and “re-education” and their effects this way:  
They treated me rather well and I was not beaten up by them. I was, 
however, blindfolded and tied up all the time. On the sixth day, they led 
me back to My Trinh and I had to stand up in front of the villagers 
gathered in meeting to acknowledge my errors and apologize to them. It 
was only then that they took off the blindfold… This was a reduction-of-
prestige campaign aimed at me and I felt very ashamed when, from the 
villagers’ ranks, some people came out to curse me….  
The advantage of Reduction of Prestige over Destruction of Oppression 
was that the former avoided stirring up unnecessary hostility against the 
Party.268 
Andrews reminds us that ideologies and warfare are correlated and are all about 
control. Ideologies compete to control political language, and warfare is but one means to 
support this goal. In village wars, assassinations of high-profile political leaders were 
carried out discretely to minimize public disapproval of the Communist Party. However, 
in other contexts, assassination can be publicly recorded to demonstrate strong grievance.  
Andrews also depicts the level of thought and planning that occurs in 
psychological and information warfare. The Communists were fixed on the social group 
as the unit of value. Their ideological critiques included offensive and defensive 
measures. The variant ideology of communist nationalism in Vietnam entailed a design 
like the socialism profile depicted in Appendix C (since communism is a totalitarian 
derivative of socialism) in which the self-determined, merged nation is the single 
legitimate political rule entity.269 Karen Armstrong raises an interesting point: “if the 
nation becomes the absolute value” there is good reason to violently defend it.270 This 
ideology did not compete simply with a limited goal of discrediting the pre-existing 
ideology but with intended revolutionary dominance and destruction of the South’s 
republic. The Viet Cong directly controlled and minimized the unintended mixture root 
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by placing committee members in the villages for the long term, making sure their 
message was transmitting clearly.  
This example displays gray attribution, in that the public was aware the Party was 
exerting some influence, but was unaware of the torture, threats, and preparation that 
went into the leadership’s public confessions. At a minimum, this is an example of gray 
deception in which officials made true confessions but at the same time concealed the 
coercive efforts of the Communists, which mattered significantly in this context. 
Repetition of the reduction-of-prestige tactic built survivability and credibility around the 
messages, leaving a negative consistency image in the minds of Southern villagers about 
their own leaders.  
The Viet Cong’s channel was a staged event in which villagers were misled to 
believe that the confessions were genuine. The sender’s most powerful microphone was 
the face-to-face channel of the victimized village officials who had to stand in front of 
their constituents and confess to petty yet culturally significant indiscretions.  
The North Vietnamese employed many of the influence techniques to gain 
compliance in this war. First, they set up a disliking circumstance for local leaders, 
causing the masses to build grievance and hostility to their seemingly incompetent 
officials. The association principle with once-respected leaders forced people to think 
their system was actually inferior. No good leader was ever put on a platform to express 
how well things would be going if only the Viet Cong were gone. This created negative 
feelings toward the faded authorities of the community, opening a void, which was 
immediately filled by the perceived actual authorities of the North. Violence in the form 
of assassination and kidnapping pacified village resistance. Also, the expanding 
community of rivalry was avoided, since insiders were coerced to praise the newcomers. 
The North Vietnamese fiercely leveraged social proof. The public confessions were very 
controlled. Not only did villagers see their leaders admitting to social taboos, but they 
also noticed that all other citizens were compliant with the new social order in the village. 
Finally, inconsistency was a prime tactic: when officials explained their own 
indiscretions, many villagers refused to follow them any longer. As Andrews notes, the 
reduction-of-prestige messages took two perceivable forms, visual and verbal; the people 
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could see weak leadership and hear incriminating confessions, leaving them to fill in the 
narration that their old village system did not work.  
A visible output of the Viet Cong movement was an increase in constituency, 
observed as the community members continued to shame the South’s officials long after 
the confessions. This psychological pressure was also passive support for the Viet Cong’s 
adherents and their goals. Poverty and exploitation are not the only ingredients for a 
revolution; a catalytic injustice must also be perceived in the social structure—either in 
the form of new demands or the feeling that old demands are no longer justifiable.271 In 
the case of the Viet Cong, they successfully convinced the villagers not to resist the 
revolution; the villagers felt their own officials were unjust and therefore they rejected 
the demands of the old system. 
Another war veteran highlights the ideological competition that Andrews is 
describing. Retired Major General Edward Lansdale concludes after serving as a military 
advisor in Vietnam and the Philippines that “Americans who go out to help others in 
people’s wars must understand that these struggles are composed of the means that shape 
the ideological end. Essentially, they are conflicts between viewpoints on the worth of 
individual man.”272 
Barrington Moore compares Western liberalism with communism as justifying 
and concealing numerous forms of repression. However, liberal repression “in the armed 
struggle against revolutionary movements” has been directed outward against others at 
times, while communist repression is directed at its own people.273 He describes the 
nature of violence as something that cannot be reduced to culture, saying that humans go 
to great lengths to influence their future through messaging:  
The assumption of inertia, that cultural and social continuity do not require 
explanation, obliterates the fact that both have to be recreated anew in 
each generation, often with great pain and suffering. To maintain and 
transmit a value system, human beings are punched, bullied, sent to jail, 
                                                 
271 Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, 220. 
272 Edward Geary Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 375. 
273 Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, 508. 
 94
thrown into concentration camps, cajoled, bribed, made into heroes, 
encouraged to read newspapers, stood up against a wall and shot, and 
sometimes even taught sociology. To speak of cultural inertia is to 
overlook the concrete interests and privileges that are served by 
indoctrination, education, and the entire complicated process of 
transmitting culture from one generation to the next.274 
E. CONCLUSION 
The operationalizing sequence is a conditional answer to the main research 
question about how developing social movements operationalize ideology, because it 
depends on how ideologies compete through the communication pathway. The sequence 
consists of considerations external and internal to social movement organizations. By 
reviewing a MISO manual and understanding how ideologies are communicated, social 
movements can create a plan to influence and control their messages. This requires 
careful consideration, since as I demonstrated in the last chapter, sending messages 
through the pathway will always have unintended interpretations and lead to unintended 
consequences.  
Ideological message forms consist of partial or robust narratives (meanings in 
stories), frames (meanings connected to social events), and memes that conduct all other 
idea replication. Additionally, as seen in the reduction-of-prestige strategy, face-to-face 
message forms are very powerful. This suggests the difficulty of fabricating messages in 
the absence of social movements to carry the political ideas forward into battle.  
The goal of resonance operations is for political messages to reach their intended 
audiences and be interpreted as expected before being dismissed, diverted, blocked, or 
distorted. The operationalizing steps, frames, narratives, and memes offered in this 
chapter provide policy and strategy analysts and decision makers with ways to compete 
ideologically in this information war.  
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VI. POLICY AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapters, I analyzed the main research question, concluding that 
by leveraging a communication pathway from ideological message senders to receivers 
and executing external and internal steps in the operationalizing sequence, a social 
movement optimizes its chances of increasing supporters and activists. To move from 
this model directly to theory-based policy recommendations, it is necessary to discuss 
some policy challenges. I shift here from discussing domestic ideological social 
movement competition to international competition, through the lens of information 
communicated within policy by Daniel Lerner. Since the American military continues to 
focus efforts in the Middle East against and with ideological movements, this chapter 
concludes with a recommendation for Special Operations Forces in the information 
warfare domain. 
Measuring policy gains in America has a short time horizon. A potential problem 
in the U.S. military is that it is focused on measuring short-term, easily visible 
performances like deaths, violent episodes, dollars passed, or numbers of people and 
units trained. The hesitancy to measure long-term effective behavior like improved civil 
perception of governance or robust capacity of the civil society is a reflection of a vague 
national grand strategy that borders on disorganization. 
Except during the Monroe Doctrine era and the Soviet Union’s rise, “the United 
States has lacked a clear consensus about its relationship to the global system,” as Walter 
Russell Mead writes.275 He also notes, “the single most-needed quality now in American 
foreign policy” is strategic elegance—a national grand strategy focused first on vital 
concerns and then on many secondary interests within economic and political constraints, 
“with the fewest risks and costs,” serving American morals.276 A RAND monograph 
explains, “Doing anything on such to-the-left-of-the-boom matters would require whole-
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of-government efforts with many attendant challenges.”277 Strategic elegance demands a 
blend of long- and short-term goals even while one’s military is at war. Are there better 
ways the military can think about ideology challenges or organize itself to compete 
effectively in information warfare? 
While the right mix of special operations and conventional forces is key for 
optimum warfighting efficiency, within the special operations community, the training, 
organization, resources, and authorities for MISO units are ideal for creating foreign 
strategic resonance operations messaging. The doctrine of these units is the foundation of 
the ideology operationalizing sequence in the previous chapter. Key to this effort, Civil 
Affairs and Special Forces can support the message senders by collecting data on 
potential audiences.  
B. POLICY COMMUNICATION 
Policy is the expression of the sovereign’s collective goals. It “is a sequence of 
decisions governing the behavior of a person, group, nation, or world body politic,” 
which will be adapted over time in light of changing conditions.278 This means that 
policy is the master of information and other tools at a country’s disposal. Anything a 
government does based on policy is designed to promote that government’s goals. By 
overcoming threats, policy functions to maintain those goals long term. 
Daniel Lerner discusses the four instruments used in policy to achieve certain 
goals: diplomacy, information, military, and economics (DIME). If the strategy is 
negotiation, then the dominant policy tool is diplomacy carried by contracts; if the 
strategy is persuasion, the dominant tool is information via symbols; if the strategy is 
coercive, the military is the tool with its implied threat of violence; and if the strategy is 
bargaining, then economics is the tool that dominates.279 Lerner explains that when 
diplomacy is the leverage tool, negotiation is the mode or strategy, and a contract is the 
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carrier of the idea. However, the persuasion mode for the information tool cuts across the 
sociopolitical world more than the other three modes; as Lerner puts it, if an audience is 
persuaded by symbols, then negotiation, bargaining, and coercion become easier.280  
Diplomacy, military, and economics manipulate the material world; information 
manipulates the symbolic world, though material effects are still possible. Lerner 
explains, “What people believe about the future shapes their responses to present events. 
And it is these beliefs about the future—the structure of expectations—which propaganda 
[or information and influence] attempts to modify on behalf of policy goals.”281 
Information does not change the environment’s conditions but the beliefs about the 
conditions. The optimal tool with which a government can change its audience’s beliefs, 
thereby shaping the audience’s responses, is persuasion. 
Carl von Clausewitz writes, “When whole communities go to war… the reason 
always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political 
object. War, therefore, is an act of policy…. political intercourse, carried on with other 
means.”282 According to Clausewitz, war is another means to achieve a political 
objective—in other words, to compete ideologically. See Figure 15 for the trickle-down 
effect in the Clausewitzian perfect system. The concept is that the important political 
decisions are made at the beginning of war, at the top of government, and trickle down to 
aligned tactics. Then, it should be fair to claim that if the national interest, grand strategy, 
or a specific policy is not articulated clearly to the tactical units, the nested decision-
making architecture is in jeopardy. 
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Figure 15.  Nested Decision-making Architecture283 
 
Certain conditions discussed in the previous chapter allow persuasion to be 
effective. Lerner identifies four essential conditions for information to be used as an 
effective policy tool: it must gain the audience’s attention; it must gain the audience’s 
credence or trust; behavior modifications must be plausible given the audience’s 
predispositions and expectations; and the audience’s environment must permit the 
behavior modification.284 Lerner explains that if a sender has somebody’s attention and 
credence, the sender can persuade him to believe his nation will lose a war. This belief 
can result in favorable long-term behaviors for the sender. 
The goal of the information tool is to influence actions to shift the power 
distribution in ways favorable to the sender. In information competition, the goal is to 
persuade the audience that one’s purpose is virtuous by the audience’s standards and that 
the rival holds an immoral position, says Lerner. This requires engagement and 
                                                 
283 Adapted from Karl Walling, “Introduction to Strategy” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, 09 July 2015). Also, Barack H. Obama, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The 
White House, February 2015), 2. Lists four enduring national interests. Not an all-inclusive list of 
American national interests. It is beyond the scope of this thesis, but I believe the upside-down pyramid is 
more realistically represented as an hourglass in which strategic ideas trickle down to tactical units, make 
impact in the world, and then begin a refinement process in reverse order until national level decision 
makers are challenged to adapt.  
284 Lerner, “Effective Propaganda,” 347. 
 99
communication through available channels. Information used this way must first modify 
the audience’s expectations before it can achieve the ultimate goal of influencing 
behavior.285  
A clear policy can assist effective political activity. If all governmental activities 
flow from policy (which is a suspect idealist presumption), the policy must be clear 
enough for a wide array of activities to align effectively. However, in a society that is 
largely individualistic in nature, a demand for competing policies arises, or worse, people 
are frozen because the bureaucrats must approve everything. Contradictory policies make 
it difficult for actions to be consistent with all policies all the time. By contrast, a society 
that is controlled by a central communist party is likely to produce a singular and more 
focused policy although maybe not one that is flexible.  
Perhaps Clausewitz’s claim that war is an extension of policy286 is incomplete. In 
the absence of overarching or singular policy, war becomes a means of survival, which is 
more consistent with Charles Darwin’s theory of gradual evolutionary change. Warfare 
can emerge without a clear policy. When tactical units are waiting for clear higher 
instructions, the options for operationalizing ideology by these legitimate forces to 
compete in information warfare are severely confused. Warfare can also force policy to 
change. However, the pre-existing ideas can be slow to adapt.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS  
In the absence of a clear, overarching grand strategy, war can influence policies. 
However, in ideal circumstances, policy objectives regulate warfare. A policy objective 
sufficient for effective strategic and operational planning will include seven components. 
First, a thorough intelligence assessment must be conducted, and a clear directive or 
objective issued (which includes a decision on the scale of limited to unlimited objectives 
and expresses whether the target is low value or high value).287 Second, subordinate 
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objectives such as political demands or settlements are explicitly described. Third, the 
war termination guidance and strategic decision points are planned at the beginning of a 
war (including placement on a short- to long-duration scale and a long-term peace 
enforcement plan). Fourth, evaluation of the capabilities, limitations, effects, costs, and 
benefits of all national instruments of war is conducted before selecting the military 
solution. Fifth, significant constraints and requirements for strategies and operations are 
articulated to the military, to ensure that war plans do not contradict other policies. Sixth, 
explicit description of the national interest at stake or the cause of conflict and depth of 
commitment is described (including a decision on the partial to total effort scale). 
Seventh, unique partners, institutions, and resources that are available and unavailable to 
the military are explained so that the planners are clear on whom to leverage to optimize 
success. As with good strategies, the policy should be feasible, and it should be detailed 
only where necessary. This policy should be communicated to action agents. Once 
political objectives are achieved, the war valve should be turned off to assess the updated 
situation.  
Suitable for a thesis on ideology, my recommendations revolve around 
communication. To avoid perpetual strategic information warfare against religious 
fundamentalism, it seems possible to open a dialogue with key movement leaders or the 
masses to determine what it will take to reduce lesser-jihad violence. Negotiation does 
not appear to be a tested policy in the current ideological competition. Every special 
operations company-level unit should have English-translation copies of the Quran, 
Hadith, and Sira to increase understanding of Islam, which is the current predominant 
religious fundamentalism competing on the world stage. I believe that communication of 
ideas through cell phones and face-to-face interaction in addition to through books will 
reduce uncertainty with this particular ideology competition.  
All branches of government are implicated here. The United States should always 
consider the ethical implications of its actions. Careful ethical analysis may determine 
inaction to be more valuable in certain circumstances. Although this synthesis of research 
findings is intended to illuminate patterns and give a greater understanding of how 
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ideology functions in the world, intentional ideology influence should be discussed at the 
highest levels of responsibility—with politicians, diplomats, and general officers. 
Resonance operations demand a streamlined process of approval and support to 
the forces within the U.S. government designed to compete using planned messages in 
information warfare. For a society that sees the world as individuals, mostly free and 
mostly equal, there seems to be too much concern about and control of U.S. MISO’s 
messaging. If we are living in a world where a religious fundamentalist in a developing 
country in the Middle East can send messages through the Internet channel to influence 
violent action in Paris, then young U.S. officers and non-commissioned officers who 
have taken the democratic oaths should be given greater authority to send messages to 
foreign audiences too. The concern of accidentally negatively influencing Americans is 
on weak footing and falls for the slippery slope fallacy. Human rights and democratic 
themes are of little concern for spillage to American audiences. In the digital age, 
America must come up with a clear policy for competing with ideological messages and 
empower units designed to lead resonance operations.  
Information warfare is a dominant form of social interaction and influence. 
Edward Luttwak explains, “All armed forces combine elements of attrition on the one 
hand and relational-maneuver on the other in their overall approach to war.”288 The 
relational-maneuver side of the spectrum looks outward, identifies the adversary’s 
weaknesses, and then can reconfigure capabilities quickly to exploit those weaknesses, all 
of which are essential to information warfare. Special Operations Forces such as MISO, 
Civil Affairs, and Special Forces are typically found on the relational-maneuver side and 
can therefore be useful in information warfare. See Figure 16 for an organizational and 
effects-driven recommendation for these three branches of service. In the figure, the term 
supported means the unit is receiving support from another unit. 
                                                 
288 Edward N. Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare,” Parameters 13, no. 4 (1983): 13. 
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The adaptive capabilities of these three units optimize policies and strategies 
competing in the ideological arena. With secretary of defense approval, Civil Affairs 
forces can collect and manage open-source civil information, and Special Forces can do 
the same for closed-source systems. Civil Affairs are the ideal forces to engage and/or 
analyze civilian elements to determine grievances among subversive social movements, 
seeking suitable partnerships to support America’s strategic messages.289 Civil Affairs 
and Special Forces together can support the MISO units, which need congressional 
approval for messaging content and audience selection. The MISO units are trained to 
assess the ideas in this thesis and accept feasible concepts to immediately compete with 
greater success in ideological warfare. Assuming they can gain access to social networks, 
Civil Affairs and Special Forces can also support the information warfare strategy with 
other tasks and capabilities essential to determining intended audiences and influencing 
them face-to-face.  
American resonance operations can reduce the need for violent conflict by taking 
a different approach: supporting ideology messaging of partner nations and supporting 
social movements against antagonistic nations and groups. It is important to understand 
that warfare has never been strictly about violence. Violence is just one means to win in 
warfare. Warfare is actually much more about information domination and control. As 
such, social movements compete for political control. Without a willing adherent pool, a 
supportive constituency, and a warmer-than-antagonistic bystander constituency, the 
social movement will have a difficult time achieving its sociopolitical goals. As the 
Commission on Countering Violent Extremism recommends, “we must flood the zone 
with alternative narratives and ideas, allowing the strongest to win.”290 
This thesis is not suggesting that the government conduct immoral or deceptive 
behavior like propaganda against fellow citizens. However, it should be acknowledged 
that politicians, their supported and supportive constituents, diplomats, military leaders, 
and social movements already attempt to influence the ideological narrative. The 
                                                 
289 Doowan Lee, “Social Movement Theory” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 21 
November 2016). 
290 Green and Proctor, Turning Point, 10–11. 
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military’s capabilities and creativity should be leveraged to support resonant ideas for the 
good society. A consensual unified effort is an efficient way to move a society, 
progressively or naturally, in a given direction. Failing to resonate with a unified 
ideology as a nation will make it difficult to craft an effective policy and can lead to 
infighting and potentially the dissolution of yet another empire.  
Two suggestions for future research may enhance discussion on information 
warfare. While Sean Everton highlights many strategies in the non-kinetic information 
realm, such as creating distrust between subgroups, deception aimed at central actors, 
discrediting or isolating brokers, and disrupting communication networks, there may be 
another way to use social network analysis (SNA).291 Within the communication network 
itself, it may be possible to tie actors to a specific idea, word, or symbol. This would 
display a web not of people who do things together, but of ideas which are heard, viewed, 
or expressed. This approach is different than linking actors to a religious site, for 
example. This is about networking what was said at a site and wherever else those ideas 
appear. To meaningfully compare ties between ideas, an analyst could draw lines from 
locations to a certain ideological component or an array of core ideological terms. This 
may be a good way to find the dissemination points of ideological messaging.  
Using SNA to link word forms and meaning might provide deeper insights into 
the root causes of violent action. A suggested starting point for this type of network 
analysis research would be to ask the developers of www.worldvaluessurvey.org about 
their surveys and the limitations they’ve experienced over the years.292 These surveyors 
can depict country groupings based on traditional, secular-rational, survival, and self-
expression values based on their questionnaires. Their findings depict how different 
regions of the world have shifted their values over time. The suggestion to use SNA to 
depict idea networks would yield an interesting ideological map. However, SNA admits 
the difficulty of quantifying certain relationships and analyzing the sociograms 
objectively. The transmitting of ideas is likely even more difficult to observe (such as two 
                                                 
291 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 368. 
292 I do not claim the surveys on this website reflect complete ideologies, however, the belief trends 
and waves can be helpful. More importantly, speaking with the surveyors may be the most helpful action. 
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people discussing the democratic process at a café), except, perhaps, on cyber systems. 
This also might be an argument in favor of capture-and-interrogate over seek-and-destroy 
strategies, although either approach can violate ethics.  
Finally, moral questions often arise in discussions on influencing human 
interaction. Often, different solutions emerge based on the normative theory that one 
resonates most closely with. It would be interesting to display the ideological profiles of 
the main normative theories and/or their authors. It should not be assumed that because 
an author wrote about an ideology he holds that ideology. Investigation into the author’s 
behaviors and thoughts matter. For example, the “greater happiness for the greater good” 
principle is often associated with socialism, while treating each human as an end in itself 
seems like liberalism. Is there an issue if someone’s moral code of thought-beliefs is 
socialistic and yet her ideology of thought-behavior is liberalism? That research could 
highlight a fundamental ideological bias in morality-based decision making. 
In this thesis I reviewed current literature on ideologies to inform policy analysts 
of its relevance in today’s information warfare. After providing background on 
communication resonance and social movement theory, I depicted how ideologies are 
transmitted through a communication pathway to the minds of intended audiences. After 
describing how ideologies compete to control political language, I outlined an 
operationalizing sequence of external and internal considerations for a social movement 
to maximize their potential successes in this environment. Armed with this information, 
this thesis supports the proactive “turning point” against non-resonant ideological 
violence as pleaded by the Commission on Countering Violent Extremism. 
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APPENDIX A.  ANOTHER LIBERALISM PROFILE 
Figure 17.  Reform to Ideal Liberalism by Thomas Hill Green293 
 
  
                                                 
293 Adapted from Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, pages on core concepts 179–181, 183–
185, 187–188, adjacent concepts 182–183, 186, and periphery concepts 189–191. My graphic interpretation 
of his description. 
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APPENDIX B.  CONSERVATISM PROFILE 




                                                 
294 Adapted from Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, core concepts found on pages 333–336, 
342, 344–345; adjacent on 333, 336, 339–340, 342, 382, 388, 391; and periphery on 334, 339, 344, 382–
383, 391–392. My graphic interpretation of his description. 
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APPENDIX C.  SOCIALISM PROFILE 
Figure 19.  Diverse Socialism without a Permanent Centerpiece295 
 
  
                                                 
295 Adapted from Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, core concepts found on 423, 425–427, 
433; adjacent on 343, 423, 427–431, 438–439, 445, 448–449; periphery on 429, 431–432, 434–436, 441–
442, 445, 451, 454–455, 478, 480. These profiles are only an abstract snapshot of the ideology, not 
necessarily illustrative of current day. Black text in this particular profile indicates deliberately associating 
ideas. 
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